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OCS LEASING AND AUCTIONS: 
INCENTIVES AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE 
BIDDING INSTITUTIONS 
James C. Cox* 
R. Mark Isaac** 
Vernon L. Smith*** 
In Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, the Supreme Court 
rebutted a challenge to the federal government's mix of "nontraditional" outer 
continental shelflease-auction mechanisms authorized under the 1978 OCS Amend- 
ments. The issues of this case addressed here include: the economic intent of the 
congressional language; incentive properties of various of the authorized auction 
processes; methodological shortcomings i herent in the implicit congressional direc- 
tiveforfield experimentation; and, the usefulness of laboratory experimental econom- 
ics in answering relevant auction-policy questions. The discussion of experimental 
economics ncludes vidence already gained from laboratory experiments relating to 
hypotheses about auction-market performance. 
On December 1, 1981, the Supreme Court decided Watt v. Energy 
Action Educational Foundation.' The suit was based on the Outer Continen- 
tal Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978.2 The plaintiffs, including the 
State of California and several consumer groups, had brought suit against 
the Secretary of the Interior, asking for a declaratory judgment that the 
governmental entities involved had abused their legislated discretion in 
not experimenting with bidding systems that use other than cash bonuses 
as bidding variables. The plaintiffs also asked for an injunction against 
further outer continental shelf (hereinafter OCS) lease sales until new 
regulations had been issued for the alternative systems, and for a prohibi- 
tion of further sales based on a fixed-royalty and variable cash-bonus bid. 
This essay examines some economic aspects of alternative auction- 
market institutions, with special reference to alternative methods for the 
auctioning of oil and gas exploration and development rights on OCS 
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lands. Our discussion is motivated by some of the economic aspects of 
the issues raised in Energy Action, and we offer some analyses of the 
implications of bidding on different dimensions of the OCS leases. But, 
the economic and methodological issues that this case raises are much 
broader than the particular bidding systems involved. These issues in- 
clude questions concerning what constitutes an experiment, what can be 
learned from experiments, what incentives alternative auction institu- 
tions provide for the bidders, and how these incentives affect he result- 
ing prices and allocations.3 
Section I briefly reviews some of the issues raised in the pleadings 
and in the Court's decision. Section II evaluates certain theoretical prop- 
erties of the alternative auction rules, with particular emphasis on some 
theoretical implications of these alternatives for the development of OCS 
leases. The original legislation, the Department of Energy regulations, 
the litigants' pleadings, and the Supreme Court's ruling all raise funda- 
mental methodological issues regarding the empirical evaluation of 
hypotheses about the relative merits of alternative auction processes. 
Consequently, Section III explores an issue implicit in the wording of the 
original legislation, namely the evaluation of auctions in some kind of 
"field" experiment undertaken by the federal government. Section III 
also explores some generic limitations on any such field inquiry. Section 
IV discusses an alternative method of evaluating auction institutions, 
namely the use of laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments are 
complementary, and, we argue, in some respects superior, to field ex- 
perimentation. We present examples from the existing experimental lit- 
erature on auction markets for two purposes: to demonstrate what 
researchers have already learned about auction markets in the laboratory, 
and to suggest what other kinds of issues directly relevant to OCS leasing 
might be amenable to laboratory testing. Sections III and IV provide 
important methodological and empirical background for further ex- 
perimentation based on the special characteristics of OCS leasing. Final- 
ly, Section V offers some concluding comments. 
I. LEGISLATIVE GOALS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
A. General Overview 
The policies at issue in Energy Action have their genesis in the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (hereinafter, the 1978 
Amendments).4 In this legislation Congress directed that the federal 
government experiment with several "nontraditional" methods of auc- 
tioning OCS oil and gas leases. The term "nontraditional" means that the 
methods differ from the historically prevalent cash-bonus bid, fixed-roy- 
alty-rate auction. 
The nine nontraditional systems specified in the legislation are: 
1. cash-bonus bid with diminishing royalty rate; 
2. cash-bonus bid with fixed profit share; 
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3. cash-bonus bid with both a fixed royalty rate and a fixed profit 
share; 
4. royalty rate bid with a fixed cash bonus; 
5. royalty rate bid with a fixed work commitment for exploration; 
6. royalty rate bid with both a fixed work commitment and a fixed 
cash bonus; 
7. profit share bid with a fixed cash bonus; 
8. work-commitment bid with a fixed cash bonus and a sliding scale 
royalty rate; 
9. work-commitment bid with a fixed cash bonus and a fixed royalty 
rate. 
In 1979 a group of litigants, including the State of California (which 
receives a share of OCS revenues), the City of Long Beach, California 
(which has a stake in some nonfederal offshore oil lands), several consum- 
er groups, and three private citizens began legal action to alter the mix 
of the alternative systems that the federal government had adopted.5 By 
1981 the government had used nontraditional auctions on leases cover- 
ing 49 percent of the total area offered, but this program had used only 
two of the nine alternatives, both involving a cash-bonus bid. The plain- 
tiffs also sought an injunction barring further lease sales until the govern- 
ment promulgated new regulations for using all of the alternative auction 
mechanisms. 
The court of appeals joined the district court in refusing to issue a 
series of injunctions against scheduled lease sales, but it ruled that the 
legislation required the Secretary of the Interior to experiment with some 
of the auctions not using the cash bonus as the bidding variable.6 The 
Secretary and others appealed, and the Supreme Court sided with the 
government, holding that, "[i]t is not for us, or for the Court of Appeals, 
to decide whether the Secretary of the Interior is well advised to forgo 
experimentation with the non-cash-bonus alternatives." 7 
The Court's ruling turned in part on the narrow question of inter- 
preting congressional language directing that twenty to sixty percent of 
leases were to be sold using nontraditional auctions.8 The government's 
aggregate usage of the various nontraditional auctions was clearly within 
those bounds, with nontraditional methods being used on 49 percent of 
the total area offered up to that time. Although the Secretary had chosen 
only those alternatives using a cash-bonus bid, the Court held that his 
action was within the legislation's requirements. Nevertheless, the 
Court's ruling did partly consider the economic and legal intentions of 
the Congress in passing the 1978 Amendments. And, it is Congress's 
economic intentions that we briefly review here. 
In directing the Secretary to use the nontraditional methods on at 
least twenty percent of the tracts at auction, and in allowing their use on 
up to sixty percent of the tracts at auction, Congress was apparently 
asking that these systems be tried out, without committing the govern- 
ment to a complete abandonment of the cash-bonus bid, fixed-royalty 
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system. Considering the legislation's extensive requirements for the ex- 
ecutive branch to report to Congress on the new systems, we interpret 
this congressional action as a desire to compare the relative efficacy of the 
various bidding mechanisms in achieving some set of policy objectives.9 
Both the legislation and the committee reports present a fairly con- 
sistent statement of congressional goals.'0 In the legislation we find, 
among others, the following four purposes: 
1. To make [OCS] resources available to meet the Nation's energy 
needs as rapidly as possible; 
2. To balance orderly energy resource development with protection 
of the human, marine, and coastal environments; 
3. To insure the public of a fair and equitable return on the re- 
sources of the Outer Continental Shelf; 
4. To preserve and maintain free enterprise competition." 
In a later section, the legislation directs that "[l]easing activities hall be con- 
ducted to assure receipt of fair market value for the lands leased and the 
rights conveyed by the Federal Government."'2 
The Conference Report lists goals that should be taken into ac- 
count, including but not limited to: 
1. Providing a fair return to the Federal Government; 
2. Increasing competition; 
3. Assuring competent and safe operations; 
4. Avoiding undue speculation; 
5. Avoiding unnecessary delays in exploration, development, and 
production; 
6. Discovering and recovering oil and gas; 
7. Developing new oil and gas resources in an efficient and timely 
manner; 
8. Limiting administrative burdens on government and industry.'3 
Even though many of the words used in these objectives are familiar 
to economists, evaluating the bidding processes in their light presents 
two difficulties. First, operationalizing their meaning in the context of 
OCS leasing must be as precise and unambiguous as possible. Second, 
even if the implications of the bidding processes are clear, there may be 
inconsistencies in the goals, which generate a consideration of policy 
trade-offs. 
To illustrate these problems, let us consider in some detail the 
objective that appears repeatedly throughout the Court's decision, the 
gaining of "fair market value" for the leases.'4 That phrase, or some 
variant of it, is issued at least nineteen times in the text and footnotes of 
the Court's decision. But, what does it mean? 
First, there is some ambiguity in the legislation regarding the defini- 
tion of the commodity for which the government is to obtain a "fair 
market value." The obvious answer is "a mineral lease" with a "fair 
market value" defined at the time of the lease's sale. This is an obvious 
answer, because the government is explicitly not in the business of pro- 
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ducing and recovering its own oil, even though it may retain a royalty 
right. Instead, what the federal government is selling is the right to 
extract and sell oil apd gas from government-owned property. As the Act 
states, it is this lease and the "rights conveyed" that Congress desires to 
be sold at a "fair market value."5 The use of the term "market" value 
confirms the interest in the value at the time that the government markets 
the commodity, the lease. This is what economists would call the valua- 
tion of the tract ex ante its development, that is, before the revelation of 
the true value of the uncertain variables in the economic calculation, such 
as the future price of oil and gas, the tract's geological productivity, and 
so forth. The ex ante point of view finds this uncertainty reflected in the 
lease's "fair market value." 
The "Definitions" sectionl6 of the legislation is not very helpful in 
pinning down Congress's use of the term "fair market value," for the 
term is defined only in the context of the minerals produced from the 
lease after that production has actually occurred: 
The term "fair market value" means the value of any mineral ... 
computed at a unit price equivalent to the average unit price at 
which such mineral was sold pursuant to a lease during the period 
for which any royalty or net profit share is accrued or reserved to 
the United States pursuant to such lease .... .7 
Economists call this value the expost average valuation of the miner- 
als. Of course, there will be a connection between the expected ex post value 
of the minerals and the ex ante value of the lease, although other variables, 
such as the rules of the lease, will also affect value. But, the "fair value" 
of the lease at the time that it is marketed is distinct from the ex post 
realization of the unknown variables. This distinction occurs in the same 
way that a house sold in 1950 had a well-defined fair market value for 
1950, regardless of its value in 1983. 
Indeed, a generous interpretation of congressional intent, based on 
the Conference Report's discussion of the definitions,'8 is that the legisla- 
tors never intended this ex post language to apply to that part of the Act 
concerning leases,'9 but only to other sections of the legislation discuss- 
ing the downstream marketing of the oil and gas products.20 Other parts 
of the same Conference Report seem more ambiguous. 
We remain unconvinced that one can rule out completely that Con- 
gress was operating with a picture of the "fair market value" of govern- 
ment OCS leases that was related to the actual expost realized value of the 
minerals.21 Nevertheless, whichever interpretation of congressional in- 
tent in the "definitions" section of the Amendments is correct really 
makes very little difference for the discussion here. The government can 
be assured of obtaining the equivalent of the ex post average price of the 
oil and gas only if it retains ownership of all of the minerals, and conse- 
quently, of all of the geological risk and the risk of oil- and gas-price 
fluctuations. This retention of rights is inconsistent with the idea of the 
leasing of government properties. Therefore, we assume that it is the ex 
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ante fair market value of the lease that interests Congress. The next step 
is to pin down the word "fair." 
In at least seven of the nineteen instances in which the Court uses 
the term "fair market value" or some similar phrase, it is in conjunction 
with some reference to the term "competition."" 22 This conjunction raises 
the question of whether Congress and the courts view the "fair market 
value" of a lease as the price that would obtain in a perfectly competitive 
market for leases. Such a linkage would be paradoxical, because a striking 
feature of the market for OCS leases is that the federal government 
dominates in the control of the remaining domestic sources of potential 
oil- and gas-bearing lands, with all of the attendant powers to limit quan- 
tities, to increase the returns that accompany this power.23 We seriously 
doubt that the Congress wishes the Secretary to act as though he is 
ignorant of the government's elling power. One should restrict attention 
to models of the market for leases that reflect this reality. Therefore, we 
view the market for leases as a series of perhaps simultaneous auctions 
for a single, indivisible unit of a unique commodity, with the seller deter- 
mining the number and timing of such sales. 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that the intent of Congress 
is to equate "fair market value" with "greatest possible expected reve- 
nue." The House Report explicitly uses the phrase "higher returns to the 
public Treasury."24 The standing granted the State of California in Energy 
Action is based in part on the claim of injury to California should the 
auctions not produce a "fair market value,"25 because by statute that 
value is shared with California. Of course, we find no evidence in the 
Court's decision of California articulating a notion of any harm that 
would befall it should the auctions yield it an "unfairly" large amount of 
money. 
If the preceding interpretation of "fair market value" is correct, 
then the nature of the issue in this "experiment" is thus. Each of the 
bidding-lease systems will cause each firm to calculate its most advanta- 
geous bid. Inter alia, this bid will depend on how many firms are bidding, 
what the firm expects other firms to do, what it believes about the uncer- 
tain future variables, and what the firm sees as its optimal pattern of 
development if it wins the auction and must pay some bonus, royalty, 
profit share, or work commitment according to the auction's rules. The 
same set of variables, as reflected in each firm's bid, yields the federal 
government at the completion of the auction a discounted stream of 
expected returns, V. This Vis composed of some combination of a cash 
bonus, royalty, or profit share, depending on the auction's rules. The 
question that Congress seems to be asking is, "which of the endorsed 
bidding schemes generates the highest total of Vs across the tracts expect- 
ed to be auctioned of"?. 
Notice that V will depend greatly on the production plan that the 
lease's terms induce the auction winner to adopt. As Section II explains, 
the lease's downstream payment terms affect he winning firm's develop- 
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ment plans.26 Therefore, suppose that for a given production schedule, 
a particular winning royalty bid, and a particular winning bonus bid, a 
cash-bonus-bid auction and a royalty-rate bid auction apparently yield the 
same values of V. We cannot assert that the two lease rules in general will 
return the same level of Vto the government, because they will commonly 
induce different production patterns. 
There are other possible interpretations of "fair market value." An 
alternative to the "highest-revenue-generating" criterion just discussed 
would be to require that the auction be fully "demand revealing." An 
auction is demand revealing if each firm's bid fully represents the max- 
imum amount that it would be willing to pay, given the rules of the lease. 
Combined with the congressional directive that the lease be awarded to 
the highest bidder, a demand-revealing auction has two important im- 
plications. First, the lease will be awarded to the firm that values it the 
most, which means that the lease allocation is efficient. Second, the win- 
ning bid correctly reveals to the government the maximum that any 
bidding firm is willing to pay for the lease. 
If demand revelation is the intent of Congress in seeking "fair 
market value," then the menu of congressionally endorsed auction pro- 
cesses leaves much to be desired, because all of the alternative proce- 
dures are being operationalized as "first-price," sealed-bid auctions, 
those in which the lease is awarded to the highest bidding firm, which 
pays the amount that it bid. A well-known property of such auctions 
under conditions of uncertainty is that they are not demand-revealing.27 
The winning bid in such auctions generally will not reflect the maximum 
willingness to pay among the bidders. Section IV contains discussion of 
the kinds of auctions that can be demand-revealing and of the properties 
of such auctions.28 
A fourth possible interpretation of "fair market value" is a sales 
price that just exhausts all of the potential willingness to pay of the losing 
bidders. To demonstrate the implications of this requirement, suppose 
that it does not hold. Then, at the moment of the auction's completion, 
there exists at least one losing bidder who, at the limit, would be willing 
to purchase the lease from the winner at a price greater than what the 
winner paid to the original seller. Therefore, in a sense the winner would 
have expropriated some residual value from the government. 
For example, suppose that a first-price auction (an auction in which 
the winner pays what he bids) is held in which the highest private valua- 
tion of the object among losing bidders is $10. If the winning bid were 
less than $10, then the "high-value" losing bidder has a limit-demand 
price greater than the price that the original seller received. Thus, $10 
is the knife-edge value that just exhausts the value of all losing bidders. 
Whether the auction's winner potentially would be willing to resell at the 
highest losing bidder's limit-demand price depends on his own valuation. 
If it is greater than $10, then he would not. If it is less than $10, then he 
would. Notice that an auction in which the winning bid does not exhaust 
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the willingness to pay of all losing bidders has two problems. Not only 
may the object be sold to one bidder for less than its opportunity cost (in 
this example, $10), but also such an auction allows the object possibly to 
be awarded initially inefficiently (that is, to a bidder who does not value 
it the most). As Section IV explains, there exist auctions that obtain this 
concept of "fair market value" and that are not first-price auctions.29 
There may be trade-offs between any one of these concepts of "fair 
market value" and any of the other congressional goals. For example, 
overly rapid production from an oil field can damage the geological 
structure's internal drives. Thus, making resources available "as rapidly 
as possible" may not be "efficient and timely," nor may it yield the 
government's maximum expected return. 
B. The Benchmark Auction Process 
Before examining economic implications of the nontraditional auc- 
tions, consider the following benchmark. Both the respondents and the 
Court in Energy Action emphasize that a common feature that distinguishes 
the nontraditional mechanisms that the Secretary had employed is the 
use of a cash bonus as the bidding variable. The respondents believed 
cash-bonus bidding to be an inherently undesirable feature.30 Let us 
consider the polar extreme case of auctions with such a feature: the 
first-price, pure cash-bonus-bid auction, with no subsequent royalty, 
rental, or profit share. Although it is not on the list of congressionally 
approved auctions, the first-price, pure bonus-bid auction can serve as a 
useful reference point, highlighting the implications of an auction that 
come from the features of the first-price-award rule of bonus bidding. 
Economists have extensively studied the first-price, pure bonus-bid 
auction.31 An important component of any model of auction decision 
making is the description of what the bidders know about the object at 
auction and about each other. This component is called the "information 
structure." Several different information structures have been examined, 
the most relevant to this discussion being the so-called "mineral-rights" 
structure.32 In the mineral-rights structure, the object at auction, in this 
case, an OCS lease, has an unknown value, x, to any winning bidder. This 
value is revealed as the field is developed. Each bidder (firm) knows some 
public (common-knowledge) information about x and enjoys some pri- 
vate information or signal about x, called s,. All firms know that each firm's 
s, is drawn independently from a distribution relating signals to the true 
tract value, x. No firm knows any other firm's si . 
There are four important aspects of the first-price, pure cash-bonus- 
bid auction in the mineral-rights information structure. First, the auction 
generally is not demand-revealing. Each firm commonly has an incentive 
to bid less than its maximum willingness to pay. This property derives 
from the first-price nature of the auction and the information structure, 
and it does not require that the cash bonus be the bidding variable.33 
Second, the relationship between the number of firms submitting 
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bids and the winning bid is much more complex than the hypothesized 
connection implicit in much of the congressional commentary. The con- 
nection between "increased competition" and "higher returns"34 sug- 
gests that Congress conceived of a very simple relationship between the 
observed number of bidders and the government's receipts, with more 
"competition," a larger number of firms bidding, yielding higher "re- 
turns." In some cases a given firm's most advantageous bid will increase 
as the number of bidders increases. But, in other cases it falls. Neverthe- 
less, under fairly general conditions the winning bid gets very close to the 
true value of x as the number of bidders gets very large. Again, this 
phenomenon is a function of the first-price auction rules and the informa- 
tion structure, and its analog could also be observed with bidding varia- 
bles other than the cash bonus.35 
Third, the winning bidder in this idealized benchmark auction views 
his payment to the government, the cash bonus, as a sunk cost in develop- 
ing the tract.36 This treatment of the bonus induces an efficient develop- 
ment program for the tract. This is a feature of the pure cash-bonus 
nature of the payment, and it would hold in other than first-price, sealed- 
bid auctions. 
Fourth, all of the development risk falls on the winning bidder and 
none of it on the government. This also is a feature of the pure cash- 
bonus payment, and it would hold in other than first-price, sealed-bid 
auctions. 
These four aspects of the benchmark auction process provide a 
useful comparison with the realities of the ten congressionally authorized 
bidding systems. A final caution to be kept in mind is that virtually all 
theoretical studies involve a common simplifying assumption, namely 
that each tract generates a demand schedule that is independent of the 
outcomes of auctions of other tracts. In reality, each OCS-lease sale 
consists of simultaneous auctions of several tracts. Because a bidder may 
view the tracts as substitutes or complements for one another, his willing- 
ness to pay for one tract may not be independent of the auction outcome 
on the other tracts. In that case, the bidder faces a more difficult com- 
binatorial problem than is usually modeled.37 
II. PROPERTIES OF AUCTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE 1978 
AMENDMENTS 
All of the auctions that the 1978 Amendments authorized are first- 
price or highest-rate auctions. Therefore, they all share the common 
generic incentive property of such auctions: each bidder has an incentive 
to under-reveal his demand, that is, to submit a bid such that the expected 
present discounted value of his total up-front and downstream lease 
payments is less than he thinks that the lease is worth when he submits 
his bid. Although all of these auctions share the under-revelation proper- 
ty, they do not necessarily share it equally. Thus, some of the authorized 
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auctions may provide bidders with quantitatively more significant under- 
revelation incentives than do others. But, the theoretical and empirical 
research that would be required to discern the comparative quantitative 
properties of these auctions has not been done. 
A second incentive property of these auctions is interrelated with, 
but distinct from, the demand under-revelation incentive; it is the nature 
of the exploration and development incentives for a winning bidder 
contained in a lease's downstream-payment terms. We discuss these in- 
centive properties here. 
Before passage of the 1978 Amendments, royalty rates were often 
set at 121/2 or 162/% percent, which led to highest-bonus bids submitted 
in the traditional auction that varied between zero, on tracts that drew no 
bids, and several hundred-million dollars. Presumably, the zero-bid tracts 
were ones about which little was known or for which the available infor- 
mation was unfavorable. Each of the tracts that drew large bonus bids was 
obviously thought to be quite valuable by at least one bidder. Much 
attention has been focused on the very large winning bonus bids and the 
implications of the size of the bonuses for the number of qualified bid- 
ding entities capable of bearing risks of that magnitude. It is commonly 
argued that only a few of the largest oil companies can bear risks on 
individual tracts of the size implied by many winning bids and that smaller 
qualified bidders are individually excluded and able to compete only if 
they can combine into joint bidding syndicates. The result is a relatively 
small number of bidders, on the order of three per leased tract. This 
outcome has been interpreted as a lack of "competition" for the leases, 
which is alleged to reduce public revenues from lease sales and to lead 
to increased concentration in OCS oil and gas production. 
The congressional committee reports express the hope that, rela- 
tive to use of the traditional auction, the adoption of some of the newly 
authorized auctions would lead to a substitution of downstream pay- 
ments for up-front payments on leases. The rationale for seeking such a 
substitution apparently was a belief that lower bonuses and higher down- 
stream payments would increase the number of bidding entities in seri- 
ous contention for leases and that this increase would enhance total lease 
revenues and diminish concentration in OCS oil and gas production. But, 
professional research does not fully support these beliefs. For example, 
the alleged positive relationship between lease sales revenues and the 
number of bidders has been challenged.38 But, since increasing the num- 
ber of bidding entities by diminishing up-front lease payments was a 
rationale for requiring the use of alternative auctions in the 1978 Amend- 
ments, we now compare auctions in these terms. 
A. Authorized Cash-Bonus-Bid Auctions 
The 1978 Amendments authorize four cash-bonus-bid auctions. 
One such auction is the fixed-royalty-rate, cash-bonus-bid auction that 
was used to auction most OCS leases in earlier years. The other author- 
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ized bonus-bid auctions differ from the familiar one in the way in which 
the contingent downstream payments are calculated. The three alterna- 
tive downstream-payment terms are: (1) diminishing or sliding-scale roy- 
alty rate, beginning at a rate not less than 121/2 percent; (2) fixed share 
of net profits, not less than thirty percent; and (3) fixed-royalty rate, not 
less than 121/2 percent and fixed share of net profits, not less than thirty 
percent. 
The Department of Energy (hereinafter DOE) issued final regula- 
tions for the fixed- and sliding-scale royalty-rate auctions that have these 
provisions.39 One auction has a cash-bonus bid, a fixed-royalty rate, and 
an annual rental payment for each leased tract. The other auction has a 
cash-bonus bid, an annual rental, and a diminishing or sliding royalty rate 
of not less than 121/2 percent at the beginning of the lease period. The 
royalty-rate schedule determines the applicable royalty rate from the 
"adjusted" value of production, with the "adjustment" based on the GNP 
fixed-weight price index.40 The applicable royalty rate is then applied to 
the actual value of production to determine the royalty payment. 
DOE issued final regulations for the cash-bonus-bid auction that 
provide for downstream-lease payments based on a fixed share of net 
profits, not less than thirty percent, and an annual rental.41 The profit- 
share rate is applied only after "capital recovery" by the lessee in the 
amount of expenses incurred for specified exploration and development 
activities plus a "reasonable" return on the investment represented by 
those expenses.42 
B. Authorized Royalty-Rate-Bid Auctions 
The 1978 Amendments authorize three royalty-rate-bid auctions. 
They differ from each other in terms of the up-front lease payments for 
which a winning bidder is liable. The three alternative up-front payment 
terms are: (1) fixed-dollar work commitment; (2) fixed-cash bonus; and 
(3) fixed-cash bonus and fixed-dollar work commitment. DOE issued final 
regulations for a royalty-rate-bid auction with a fixed-cash bonus and an 
annual rental.43 A winning bidder in this auction is responsible for royalty 
payments based on the constant royalty rate specified in his (highest) 
royalty-rate bid. 
C. Authorized Profit-Share-Bid Auction 
The 1978 Amendments authorize one profit-share-bid auction. The 
up-front payment term of this auction is a fixed-cash bonus. DOE issued 
final regulations for an auction with a net-profit-share-bid variable, a 
fixed-cash bonus, and an annual rental payment for each tract.44 In this 
auction, a winning bidder is responsible for up-front payment of the 
fixed-cash bonus. The downstream payments based on the profit-share 
bid are calculated thus. Before payment of any net-profit share to the 
government, a lessee can recover specified exploration and development 
expenses, plus a "reasonable" return on the investment represented by 
those expenses. Following this "capital recovery," the lessee is liable for 
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payment of a share of net profits from production and sales equal to the 
highest profit share bid in the auction.45 
D. Authorized Dollar Work-Commitment-Bid Auctions 
The 1978 Amendments authorize two dollar-work-commitment-bid 
auctions. Both auctions have a fixed cash-bonus, up-front-payment liabil- 
ity for a winning bidder. The auctions differ in the method of calculating 
downstream payments in that one has a fixed-royalty rate and the other 
has a diminishing- or sliding-royalty rate, beginning at a rate of not less 
than 12? percent. DOE issued final regulations for an auction with a 
dollar-work-commitment-bid variable, a fixed-cash bonus, a fixed-royalty 
rate, and an annual rental payment for each tract.46 In this auction, a 
winning bidder is responsible for up-front payment of the fixed-cash 
bonus and for the amount of his work-commitment bid, to be paid either 
in cash or as a performance bond. The winner can satisfy the dollar-work 
commitment and recoup the cash payment or bond by conducting quali- 
fying exploration activities. He may apply fifty percent of the allowable 
expenditures on such activities in satisfaction of the work-commitment 
bid. 
E. Properties of the Cash-Bonus Bid, Fixed-Royalty-Rate Auction 
The cash-bonus bid, fixed-royalty-rate auction has been used to sell 
most OCS leases to date. Under the OCS Lands Act,47 and under the 
1978 Amendments,48 the royalty rate used in any particular lease sale 
must be not less than 12? percent. Setting the royalty rate affects both 
the timing of lease payments and their cumulative total. Ceterisparibus, the 
higher (lower) is the royalty rate the lower (higher) is the bonus bid that 
any bidder will make on a lease. Thus, in specifying the royalty rate, the 
Secretary is determining a division of total lease payments between up- 
front bonus and downstream contingent payments. But, the cumulative 
total payment on a lease also can vary with the royalty rate. The reason 
for this variation is the royalty rate's exploration and development incen- 
tive effect on a winning bidder. In addition, since the royalty rate affects 
the division of lease payments between a certain front-end bonus and 
contingent royalty payments, it affects the allocation of the risk borne on 
the leased tract between the private lease buyer and the public lease 
seller.49 In other words, since a higher royalty rate leads to a lower lease 
bonus, the higher rate causes a substitution of risky contingent-royalty 
payments for certain lease-bonus payments; hence, the higher rate shifts 
risk from the lease buyer to the lease seller. 
Clearly, by choosing a royalty rate that is considerably higher than 
the traditional rates, the government could substantially reduce the aver- 
age size of winning bonus bids. Such a reduction would make it possible 
for a larger number of qualified bidders to bear the risk of the up-front 
bonus. But, high royalty rates create undesirable incentives for the ex- 
ploration and development of leased tracts. The reason for these effects 
is that before income tax the lessee must pay 100 percent of the explora- 
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tion and development cost, but he only receives that 100 percent minus 
the royalty percentage rate of the oil produced. For example, if the 
royalty rate is 662/3 percent, then to have an incentive to incur the ex- 
pense, a lessee would have to expect a present discounted value of at least 
$3 of oil production to result from an additional $1 of exploration and 
development expense. By implication, very high royalty rates would lead 
to some otherwise promising tracts not being efficiently developed. 
Therefore, trying to increase the number of competing bidders by setting 
high royalty rates in the traditional auction would lead to less efficient 
tract development and probably less production on OCS tracts. The 
risk-allocation and exploration-development incentive implications of 
the royalty rate are thus central to an evaluation of the traditional OCS- 
lease auction and provide useful criteria for comparing the traditional 
auction to the other auctions authorized in the 1978 Amendments. 
E Comparison of the Newly Authorized Bonus-Bid Auctions with the Fixed- 
Royalty-Rate, Bonus-Bid Auction 
How do the newly authorized bonus-bid auctions compare with the 
traditional auction in terms of risk allocation and exploration and devel- 
opment incentives? First, consider the net-profit-share auction. As set 
out in the applicable DOE regulations, a lessee would be allowed (capital) 
recovery of allocable exploration and development expenses, plus a "rea- 
sonable" return on those expenses, before beginning profit-share pay- 
ments on the lease. The lion's share of exploration and development 
expenses are the costs of drilling and equipping wells. Furthermore, even 
the largest oil companies usually contract out drilling on OCS leases to 
specialized companies. Hence, the capital-cost deduction in contempla- 
tion of law under a net-profit-share lease should correspond closely to the 
actual economic (capital) costs of exploring and developing leases. But, 
these investment costs, plus a "reasonable" return on the costs, are 
deductible from (production-sales) revenue before any net profit-share 
payment liability is incurred. Therefore, on leases acquired under the net 
profit-share auction, a (risk- neutral) lessee will have an incentive to make 
all exploration and development investment expenditures that yield ex- 
pected revenue with a present discounted value that exceeds the invest- 
ment cost. Hence, the downstream-payment terms of leases sold under 
the net profit-share auction would not have the severe exploration and 
development disincentives of the traditional auction with high royalty 
rates. 
The net profit-share variant of the bonus-bid auction thus appears 
superior to the traditional auction for reducing bonus bids by increasing 
expected downstream payments on leases. Setting relatively high profit- 
sharing rates will lead to relatively low winning bonus bids. This reduc- 
tion in the magnitude of bonus bids will increase the number of bidders 
able to bear the risk of the up-front bonus, by transferring part of the risk 
to the government in the form of contingent profit-share payments; 
hence, the number of bidders in the auction should expand. 
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A further consideration in comparing these two auctions concerns 
enforcement and compliance costs. To comply with DOE regulations on 
leases sold under the new auction, lessees must adopt the new accounting 
scheme.50 In addition, the United States Geological Survey (hereinafter 
USGS) will be required to audit the new net-profit accounts. 
Next, consider the diminishing royalty-rate variant of the bonus-bid 
auction. A relatively high royalty-rate schedule will substitute down- 
stream payments for up-front bonus payments on a lease, and therefore 
it should increase the number of auction bidders. But, as with relatively 
high fixed royalty rates (horizontal schedules), relatively high sliding 
royalty-rate schedules imply a severe disincentive for exploration and 
development activity. In deciding whether further exploration and devel- 
opment is worthwhile, a lessee will be concerned with the expected 
present discounted value of royalty payments. If those payments are a 
large proportion of the expected present discounted value of the increase 
in production that would result from the increased investment, then the 
investment may not occur. It makes little difference to this analysis wheth- 
er a high average royalty rate results from a horizontal or a decreasing 
rate schedule. 
A decreasing royalty-rate schedule can have an advantage for pro- 
longing production from depleted fields with high average production 
costs. After a fully developed lease has been in production for many 
years, the natural drive of the reservoir, and therefore the production 
rate, declines. But, yearly production costs do not decrease as rapidly as 
does yearly production. Indeed, yearly production costs can increase. 
Therefore, average production cost increases. As soon as average pro- 
duction cost exceeds the average value of production times one minus the 
royalty rate, it will no longer pay to continue production on the lease. 
Production can be prolonged if the royalty rate decreases sufficiently, and 
certainly, if it decreases to zero.51 
G. Comparison of Royalty-Bid Auctions with Bonus-Bid Auctions 
In a royalty-bid auction, USGS would set the up-front payment 
terms of a lease, and the downstream payments, other than lease rental, 
would depend on the winning royalty-rate bid. First, consider the auction 
in which the up-front payment is a fixed cash bonus set by USGS. Ceteris 
paribus, a high bonus will lead to low royalty bids and vice versa. But, if 
high bonuses are a problem, it matters little whether they are set by the 
lessor or determined by bid. Furthermore, if high royalty rates lead to 
inefficiency in exploration and development, it also matters little whether 
the high royalty rates are set by the lessor or determined by bid. Thus, 
the royalty-bid, cash-bonus auction does not appear to promote the ob- 
jectives set out in the 1978 Amendments. 
The variant of the royalty-bid auction with a fixed-dollar work com- 
mitment has somewhat different properties than the cash-bonus variant 
of this auction. To date, the DOE has not issued regulations for this 
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auction. But, if such regulations are forthcoming, then a fixed-dollar work 
commitment will share many of the features of the work-commitment-bid 
auction. Specifically, assume that a lessee could recoup a fixed-dollar 
work-commitment payment or performance bond by a fifty-percent credit 
on allowable exploration expenses, as in the work-commitment-bid auc- 
tion. This credit would provide a fifty-percent subsidy to incremental 
exploration expenditures as long as the work commitment had not been 
met. This incentive would interact with the incentive for under-invest- 
ment in exploration and development inherent in a positive royalty rate. 
But, the USGS would not have the necessary information to allow it to 
fine-tune these offsetting incentive effects for exploration, to achieve 
lease-payment terms that promote efficiency in exploration. The work- 
commitment variant of the royalty-bid auction would thus appear to have 
less severe exploration disincentive effects than would the cash-bonus 
variant. But, the cash-bonus-bid, net-profit-share auction appears to 
dominate both of these auctions in promoting efficiency in exploration 
and development. 
H. Comparison of the Profit-Share-Bid Auction, 
with Bonus-Bid Auctions 
The profit-share-bid, fixed-cash-bonus auction can have the same 
advantage as the cash-bonus-bid, fixed-profit-share auction just dis- 
cussed: a relatively low up-front bonus can be combined with relatively 
high downstream payments, without severe exploration and develop- 
ment disincentives. Therefore, the preceding comparisons of the bonus- 
bid, net-profit-share auction to other auctions can apply to the profit- 
share-bid auction. There is one possible problem with the profit-share 
bid, fixed-bonus auction that is not shared by the bonus-bid, fixed-profit- 
share auction. That is the possible incentive for premature lease aban- 
donment by capacity-constrained firms facing very high, bid-determined 
profit-sharing rates. USGS can guard against this outcome by not setting 
very low fixed bonuses. 
I. Comparison of Dollar-Work-Commitment-Bid, 
Auctions with Bonus-Bid Auctions 
The dollar-work-commitment-bid auction has some interrelated, 
unusual properties for both lease-value determination and for efficiency 
in exploration. The efficiency implications follow from the fifty-percent 
credit for qualifying exploration expenses toward recouping the work- 
commitment cash payment or performance bond. As long as the work- 
commitment bid has not been fulfilled, the fifty-percent credit provides 
an incentive, a subsidy, for overinvestment in qualifying exploration ac- 
tivities. This incentive interacts with the incentive for underinvestment in 
exploration and development inherent in a positive royalty rate. The net 
effect of these provisions is a disincentive to development and an incen- 
tive for exploration of generally indeterminate direction and size. 
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The lease-valuation properties of this auction are confused with its 
implicit subsidy to exploration. If the fixed bonus, royalty rate, and rental 
terms of a lease are sufficiently low, then a bidder has an incentive to 
calculate his work-commitment bid as if it were a partially rebatable 
bonus bid. In that case this auction, in effect, becomes a bonus-bid, 
fixed-royalty-rate auction with an implicit subsidy to exploration. Alter- 
natively, if the lease's fixed terms are sufficiently high, then a bidder has 
an incentive simply to bid fifty-percent of his expected subsidized ex- 
penditure on qualifying exploration activities. In that case, this auction 
does not provide a market-determined value for the lease. 
The preceding discussion reveals that elementary economic theory 
can provide some insights into the properties of the authorized auctions. 
But, we cannot resolve in this way some of the questions that the legisla- 
tion posed. In particular, the concern with the relative revenue-generat- 
ing properties of the auctions presents some challenging questions for 
theoretical and empirical research. 
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF AUCTIONS 
We have loosely referred to the congressional directive for using 
nontraditional auctions as an "experiment." This terminology also ap- 
pears in the Court's decision.52 In its broadest sense, the term "experi- 
ment" could mean "investigation," encompassing both theoretical and 
empirical analysis. 
The previous section demonstrates that economic theory can an- 
swer some of the questions implicit in the legislation and its congression- 
al history. But, theoretical analysis in the absence of empirical testing is 
of limited and questionable value. As Section II suggests, some of the 
questions that Congress is asking are in advance of the current state of 
theoretical knowledge. Some of the results are qualitative, and if an 
auction displays mutually countervailing qualitative incentives, then the 
net theoretical prediction can be ambiguous. And, just because a well- 
formed theory exists does not imply that the theory has passed the test 
of yielding valid predictions. 
Theoretical and field or laboratory experimental analyses are com- 
plementary. The judicious use of theory can guide the experimenter in 
discerning which are the most important tests. By demonstrating that one 
or more of the auction mechanisms creates undesirable incentives, 
theoretical analysis can winnow out the promising auction mechanisms 
for further empirical tests.53 Results of empirical studies also may provide 
insights for extending the state of theoretical knowledge. In this way, 
theory and experiment synergistically interact. 
Likewise, field and laboratory observations can complement each 
other and economic theory." Nevertheless, there are important meth- 
odological differences between these two empirical approaches. We 
argue here that the field-experiment approach that the 1978 Amend- 
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ments implicitly endorsed harbors many methodological shortcomings. 
We then examine the relatively new technique of laboratory experiments, 
which is potentially superior to field tests in answering questions that 
Congress asked in the 1978 Amendments. 
A. The Congressional Directive as a Field Experiment 
In the 1978 Amendments, Congress directed that the nontradition- 
al auctions account for at least twenty percent of the total number of 
auctions.55 The Amendments also include extensive requirements for the 
Secretary to report to Congress on the results of the various auctions.56 
These requirements add up to asking the Secretary to conduct a field 
experiment. 
In the argot of experimentation, the primary "treatment variable" 
in the experiment is the legal-institutional environment, defined by the 
auction rules and the lease's downstream features. But, there are other 
variables less under the Secretary's control that could affect he bidding 
firms' decisions. Some of these variables relate to the geological and 
economic environment, for example, to the geological structure under 
the tracts, the implications of seismic or other surveys, the present and 
expected future prices of oil and gas, and so forth. We use the phrase 
"geonomic variables" to identify this category of variables. Another cate- 
gory includes those variables that relate to the motivational and decision- 
making attributes of the specific firms in the bidding. We call these 
"bidder-specific" variables. 
A primary requirement for a valid experiment is that the geonomic 
and bidder-specific variables remain constant while the institution is al- 
tered. In field experiments, in which complete control usually is not 
possible, that control could be approximated if the geonomic and bidder- 
specific variables were randomized and unbiased in their occurrence 
among the different auction institutions. 
Perhaps because of the guidance of the received theory, we might 
also believe that the auctions' relative performances will depend on the 
realized values of the geonomic variables, as the auction institution is 
perturbed. If this proposition requires tests at different realizations of the 
geonomic variables, at least one of two conditions must hold: first, the 
geonomic variables must be experimenter controlled and alterable; or 
second, the geonomic variables are not experimenter controlled, but they 
must occur at the "appropriate" values randomly and unbiasedly across 
the other treatments. Of course, in either case the experimenter should 
know the pattern of the geonomic variables, to associate their realization 
with the performance of the auctions. Finally, after collecting all of the 
relevant data under all of the appropriate experimental conditions, the 
experimenter can compare the various institutions with reference to the 
exogenously determined policy objectives. 
Compare this idealized field-experiment process with the attri- 
butes of the OCS field "experiment." First, there is little ability to control 
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geonomic and bidder-specific conditions as the auction mechanism is 
varied. The only way that the government can perturb the auction institu- 
tion is across the different OCS tracts. To begin to meet the conditions 
of unbiased randomness and to allow for appropriate statistical inference, 
the Secretary could take a block of perhaps several hundred tracts, assign 
them randomly among the different auction methods, and then conduct 
all of the auctions simultaneously. Aside from the possible contamination 
of the experiment from tract-value interdependencies, there is the prob- 
lem of bidder self-selection biases across the different auction institu- 
tions.57 
Second, the government also has very little ability to alter the geo- 
nomic variables to values that create the most powerful or critical tests. 
Even if the geonomic variables that prevail appear randomly across the 
treatments, some key realizations simply might not be observed in the 
field. 
Third, there is a vast amount of uncertainty associated with any OCS 
auction. Not only are many of the geonomic variables usually unknown, 
.but also the government probably knows little about variations in bidder 
expectations regarding these variables. Similarly, the government might 
know little about variations in the bidder-specific variables across auction 
participants. 
Fourth, to the extent that Congress desires an ex post evaluation of 
its objectives, the appropriate data could take decades to collect. For 
example, to compare the revenue-generating properties of different auc- 
tions using field data, the experimenter would have to wait until data on 
downstream lease payments were available. 
Finally, for the experiment to be valid, every experimental sample 
requires a binding commitment o lease an OCS tract under the proposed 
rules. The field experiment may demonstrate that one of the approved 
auction processes results in disastrous agreements, but only at the ex- 
pense of obligating the government to precisely such agreements on one 
or several OCS tracts. The Secretary might exercise statutory discretion 
to refuse to issue tracts from mechanisms discovered to be unsatisfactory 
and to rerun the auction with a different mechanism. But, the widespread 
expectation that this ex post change in rules might occur would alter 
bidder decisions in the first auction, rendering the resulting observations 
misleading or useless. 
Hence, although the government collects a large amount of data 
from OCS auctions, what it can learn in the scientific sense from these 
observations is severely limited. Given some of the attributes of OCS 
auctions, we can easily illustrate the potential pitfalls of field experimen- 
tation. Suppose that, from a large body of field data from OCS auctions, 
one wanted to compare auctions A and B. For the comparison to be valid, 
processes A and B should each have been tested unbiasedly across all of 
the relevant combinations of geonomic variables. But, if auction A was 
used exclusively in 1979-1980, while process B was tested exclusively in 
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1983, then a valid comparison seems impossible, because of the great 
difference in oil-market conditions in the two periods. Or, suppose that 
both were offered together in a relatively comparable time frame. Then, 
the expectations about underlying geological characteristics hould have 
been randomly and unbiasedly distributed between the tracts offered 
under auctions A and B. And, if the two kinds of auction processes were 
indeed tested in the same time period, this simultaneity creates a real 
possibility of self-selection bias in the observations. Although none of 
these potential shortcomings necessarily must materialize, we use them 
to emphasize the problems of interpreting OCS field data. 
B. An Alternative Experimental Technique 
The government might consider the use of laboratory-experimental 
methods as a supplement to field experimentation. This technique has 
already found use in many areas of economic research in general, and in 
the study of auction markets, in particular. We will not repeat here in 
detail the history of this technique's methodological grounding. Instead, 
we refer the reader to other work on this subject,58 and we list briefly 
some of the potential advantages of the laboratory technique. Section IV 
examines some of the existing experimental results on the performance 
of auction markets and discusses how they relate to the questions raised 
by the 1978 Amendments and by Energy Action. 
The first and principal advantage of laboratory experimentation is 
in the control provided over the test's parameters. Perturbing the bidding 
rules and institutions is straightforward, and it can be accomplished in a 
relatively short time. The experimenter also has knowledge of and con- 
trol over the experiment's features that are homologous to the geonomic 
conditions of an OCS auction. As an example, we could design an experi- 
ment so that the bidders are uncertain of the auctioned object's value and 
yet the experimenter can know and alter the information on which bid- 
ders base their estimate of that value. We can also alter the noninstitu- 
tional variables, such as individual values for the auctioned items, so that 
we can compare the bidding institutions at several reference points.59 
A secondadvantage of laboratory experiments is that we can conduct 
informative tests of the different bidding institutions with values of the 
geonomic conditions that have never been observed in the field. We can 
create these conditions in the laboratory. 
A third advantage of laboratory experimentation is that the direct 
resource cost is low, as is the opportunity cost of discovering the malper- 
formance of one of the auction mechanisms. One of the processes might 
fail, but we have wasted no OCS tracts to find that out. 
Finally, replication under controlled conditions is easy, and data 
collection is relatively quick. Both field and laboratory experiments have 
the limitation that bidder-specific attributes, such as risk preferences and 
adaptation abilities, are relatively unobservable. But, the laboratory tech- 
nique enjoys at least three advantages concerning this problem. First, 
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replication to sense the robustness of the results to individual idiosyncra- 
cies is easier in the laboratory than in the field. Second, we can more truly 
randomize individual bidders among institutions in the laboratory, with 
a lower probability of self-selection biases. Third, in the laboratory there 
are some partial ways to control or test for the influence of bidder-specific 
attributes, such as risk aversion, even if those attributes are unobservable. 
Laboratory experiments surely cannot answer all of the questions 
that one might ask. But, any interpretation of either field or laboratory 
data in terms of an underlying hypothesis about bidder decision making 
requires certain control conditions. Laboratory experiments can test al- 
ternative models with control conditions not realizable in the field. From 
the results of laboratory tests, one is in a better position to reject inappro- 
priate models and to select the more promising model or models of 
bidder decision making for further use in assessing policy alternatives, or 
in designing better field experiments for auctioning OCS leases. Time 
requirements are relatively brief, and laboratory experiments, again, re- 
quire no commitment of OCS tracts as a part of the tests. 
We would not pretend to anticipate the outcome of a comprehen- 
sive laboratory experimental test of any or all of the alternative OCS 
auctions. Each contains features that have not yet been incorporated in 
laboratory experimental work. Nevertheless, there has been extensive 
experimental research into other similar kinds of auction mechanisms. 
Section IV describes the nature of this research. When appropriate it 
reports what the existing auction experiments tell us about what we know, 
and about what we can potentially learn in the laboratory, concerning the 
various kinds of OCS auctions. 
IV. THE STANDARD AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PERFORMANCE 
Historically, a great variety of auction institutions has evolved for 
the sale of a single object, such as an antique or a painting, or multiple 
units of identical items, such as U.S. Treasury Bills or gold bars. When 
there are multiple units of nonidentical items, it is customary to auction 
individual items in some sequence, as in livestock auctions, or in assem- 
bled lots, as in the Netherlands' produce and flower auctions. The OCS 
auctions differ from all of these examples in that individual tracts in a 
given auction are not identical, although they may be close substitutes or 
complements, and separate simultaneous bids must be tendered for each 
tract that each bidder desires. 
While this technical difference between OCS and standard auctions 
is a feature of consequence, there are several reasons why an analysis of 
some of the standard auction systems is of direct interest and relevance 
to OCS leasing. First, the standard auctions illustrate some of the rich 
variety of different institutional procedures available for use in OCS 
leasing, whether the bids are in cash, as a royalty percentage, or in other 
forms. Second, theoretical analysis of these different auction institutions 
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suggests that the price and efficiency of an award reflect the kind of 
auction used. Third, experimental evidence demonstrates that the kind 
of auction used affects both price and efficiency. Fourth, when the results 
differ among the different standard auctions, it is because the auction 
rules affect bidding incentives. We expect these incentive differences to 
apply with equal force to OCS leasing. 
Here, we provide a brief overview of those auction institutions, the 
"standard" auctions, for which theories of bidding have been articulated, 
and that have been subjected to a rigorous experimental examination. To 
date, there has been no experimental examination of auction institutions, 
or of the theory of such institutions, that have the distinguishing proper- 
ties of OCS tracts, namely, simultaneous bidding on multiple nonidenti- 
cal items, and item valuation based on the acquisition of costly 
information. In view of the growing use of experimental methods in the 
study of pricing institutions, future research is likely to address these 
properties of OCS tracts. 
A. Definitions of the Standard Auctions 
Although the literature distinguishes a great number of different 
auctions, there are only four primary kinds: The English and Dutch "oral" 
auctions, and the first- and second-price, sealed-bid auctions.60 
English auctions. These are the most commonly known auctions in the 
United States. The process begins with the auctioneer soliciting an initial 
bid from the crowd of potential buyers, for some object that is offered 
for sale. Any announced bid, when recognized by the auctioneer, 
becomes the standing bid. Any new bid is admissible only if it is higher 
than the standing bid. The sequence of ascending bids, each displacing 
its predecessor, ends when the auctioneer cannot solicit a new higher bid, 
and the item is declared sold to the last bidder at a price equal to the 
amount that he bids. Bidders can easily preserve their anonymity by 
agreeing to a private signaling system with the auctioneer. In some auc- 
tions, the auctioneer actively solicits bids, while in others the auctioneer 
merely recognizes bids that are freely announced from the floor. Most 
public auctions of art, antiques, equipment, livestock, and household 
goods in the United States and Great Britain use the English method. It 
is probably the oldest auction system. Thus, Cassady notes that according 
to Herodotus the Babylonians auctioned marriageable women as early as 
500 B.C., and the method of auction appears to have followed the ascend- 
ing-bid procedure.61 Roman auctions probably used the ascending-bid 
procedure, since the word auction derives from the latin root auctus, 
meaning "an increase."62 
Dutch auctions. In the Dutch-auction procedure, the price begins at 
a level considered to be higher than any buyer is willing to pay, and the 
auctioneer decreases it orally until the first buyer signals acceptance. The 
item is awarded to this buyer at the price standing at the time of accept- 
ance. Produce and cut flowers are sold in the Netherlands by this proce- 
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dure, and an electric clock whose hands rotate counterclockwise au- 
tomatically displays the descending prices. The buyer wishing to accept 
the standing-offer price depresses a button that stops the clock. Although 
this procedure is less familiar in the United States than is the English 
auction, it is often encountered here in some form. In Boston, Filene's 
Basement is famous for marking down all clothing on a regular schedule. 
The schedule rules are displayed and well known to shoppers. The air- 
lines have used a variant of the Dutch procedure when a flight is over- 
booked, to induce volunteers to relinquish seat claims. In this case, there 
is a single buyer and many potential sellers. Hence, the "Dutch price," 
representing a bid to buy rather than an offer to sell, must ascend. 
Although the exact procedure probably varies, one approach is to raise 
the bid until enough passengers accept to clear the flight of all over- 
booked seats, with all such passengers receiving the same compensation. 
In multiple-unit Dutch auctions, buyers need not pay a common 
price. Thus, according to Cassady, "[o]rdinarily, the first bid is the only 
bid, although it is conceivable, if the amount taken is optional, that the 
balance of a lot would be sold by continuing the price downward."63 In 
the case of heterogeneous items, such as the component tracts of an OCS 
auction block, one could use the Dutch auction, allowing the first success- 
ful bidder the option of selecting the tract desired at the first acceptance 
price. The offer price then could continue its descent until a second 
acceptance, with the second bidder selecting the tract desired, and so on, 
until all tracts are sold. 
First-price auctions. This is the well-known and widely used procedure 
in which each bidder submits a written bid. All bids are opened at once, 
and the highest bidder is awarded the item at a price equal to the amount 
bid. Thus, the first, or highest bid determines the price. As noted earlier, 
this is the institution used in OCS bidding. In the OCS auctions, all of 
the bids and bidders on each tract are publicized, notjust the winning bid. 
Practices vary concerning the post-auction announcement of bids. In 
some sealed-bid auctions only the winning bid is announced, and in some 
only the winning and second highest bids are made public. In the primary 
auction of U.S. Treasury bills, a multiple-unit, sealed-bid auction, only 
the highest and lowest accepted bids are announced, but the identity of 
the bidders is not made public. 
Second-price auctions. These auctions proceed as under the first-price 
rules, except that the highest bidder wins and pays a price equal to the 
second-highest bid submitted. This procedure is rarely used in practice, 
but it has been of considerable interest in the economics literature on 
auctions, because of its incentive properties.64 The second-price auction 
was first defined and analyzed by Vickrey,65 and it is sometimes called the 
"Vickrey auction." In the London stamp auction, and also in some pri- 
mary fish markets that use oral English auctions, buyers not present are 
allowed to submit book bids. 
In book bidding, the award is made at one level, or price interval, 
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above the floor bid or the second-highest book bid, whichever is 
larger. ... If he [the auctioneer] gets no bid from the floor, the 
goods are knocked down to the highest book bidder at a price just 
above the offer of the second-highest bidder.66 
This is exactly the procedure that Vickrey calls the "second-price" 
method, except for the modification of the use of a standard-bid advance 
interval.67 Cassady also describes a written-bid auction "utilized in cer- 
tain market situations, permitting each bidder to submit two bids rather 
than one. His higher bid goes into effect only if his lower bid does not 
exceed the bids of competitors, but the award is made on the basis of the 
lower figure if it is higher than the highest bid of competitors."68 This 
scheme may include the second-price auction, and it may be quite old.69 
B. Auction-Market Theory 
The four basic auctions just defined have distinct information and 
incentive properties, and as a consequence, they may yield different 
prices or allocations. The example illustrated in Figure 1 facilitates our 
discussion of the theory of these auctions. There, we suppose that there 
are N;2 buyers willing to bid for a single, indivisible item that the seller 
offers at any positive price determined in the auction; that is, the seller 
specifies no reservation price. 
Our analysis here adopts four primary assumptions. First, each buy- 
er i associates a known (to that buyer) cash value, v,, with the item, such 
that v, is defined as the maximum amount that i would be willing to pay 
for the item rather than lose it to another buyer. Second, if i and j are 
distinct persons, then the value, v,, to any i is independent of the value, 
v p, to any j, in the sense that v, would not change if i had knowledge of 
vj, and vice versa, for any i and j. In particular, this means that each 
person's maximum willingness to pay has no information value for any 
other person. Third, each ihas complete knowledge only of his own value, 
and not that of others. And, fourth, the cost of transacting-thinking, 
deciding, and bidding-is negligible for each person. 
We note that the second assumption does not prevent individual 
valuations from being correlated or associated in other ways. For exam- 
ple, all values cah be "high" or "low" for some object relative to another 
object, yet remain independent in the sense of this assumption. The 
second assumption has important consequences for the analysis of auc- 
tions, and later we discuss the effect of relaxing it.70 This assumption is 
important for applications to OCS leasing, because differences in in- 
dividual values may reflect differences in information, and therefore val- 
ues may not be independent if some bidders would be unwilling to ignore 
these information differences.71 By itself, the first assumption is relatively 
innocuous for the analysis of auctions. If the value of an item to a bidder 
is uncihrtain, then we need only suppose that the uncertain prospect has 
an equivalent cash-certain value, reflecting the degree to which that per- 
son discounts for uncertainty because of risk aversion. The third assump- 
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tion is important and necessary, because all valuations are inherently 
private and subjective. Furthermore, people are not normally well-moti- 
vated to reveal credible information about their own valuations to other 
market participants. 
For convenience of exposition, Figure 1 numbers the buyers, so that 
v, > v2 > ... > v,, > v,, and it also rules out tied values. We say that 
an auction is efficient (Pareto optimal) in allocation if it awards the item to 
the person who values it most highly (buyer 1, in Figure 1). As Section 
I explains, the essence of this definition is that an efficient allocation 
exhausts the gains from exchange.72 If the item is awarded to any buyer 
except 1, say, to 3, then that buyer can resell the item to 1 at a price (above 
v, but below v,) that yields a monetary gain to both persons. Observe 
that, by this definition, efficiency is an attribute of an auction quite dis- 
tinct from the price resulting from an auction. One auction method might 
yield a higher proportion of efficient allocations than a second, even 
though prices achieved using the second auction are higher than those 
achieved with the first. This is because efficiency depends on the buyer 
with value v, bidding high relative to the bids of other buyers, while the 
auction price depends on the absolute level of the highest bid. Obviously, 
Figure 1. 
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all bids might be quite low, but the award efficient, while all bids could 
be high, but the award inefficient. Consequently, a high price does not 
necessarily imply an efficient award, and the two attributes, price and 
efficiency, may be in conflict.73 Later, we provide experimental data 
demonstrating that this possibility is more than a mere abstract curi- 
osity.74 But, from Figure 1 it is clearly possible for price to be such that 
the auction must be efficient; any price between v, and v,, by the defini- 
tion of vi, must yield an efficient allocation. 
Since, in any given market, the vi are not observable, the only 
evidence that may suggest inefficiency is the occurrence of an after- 
market exchange.75 If we observe two participants in a given auction 
market engaging in an after-market trade, and if the second assumption 
is correct, then the auction could not have been efficient. By contrast, in 
the OCS auction, in which values may differ because bidders have differ- 
ent information, and in which multiple nonidentical tracts are auctioned, 
after-market exchange may occur, because bidders reassess values based 
on information that the bids have revealed. Or, perhaps just as likely, 
bidders may want to acquire tracts in certain combinations, and they 
failed to do so in the primary auction.76 The publicity of prices at auctions 
all but guarantees that an inefficient award will be reallocated to the 
highest-value bidder in a subsequent private exchange. The highest- 
value bidder, observing that the award was at a price below his willingness 
to pay, has an incentive to approach the winning bidder with a higher 
bid.77 
English auctions. In English auctions, if at any time the standing bid, 
bj, is below the value to buyer i, then i has an incentive to raise the bid 
by some amount no greater than v, - bj. In auctions with a standard bid 
increment, d, buyer i would be prepared to bid b;= b+ d. This process of 
raising the standing bid will continue until buyers 1 and 2 are the only 
active bidders. (See Figure 1). If the penultimate bidder, buyer 2, bids b, 
= v2- d, then buyer 1 will be the final winning bidder with a bid of bl = v2, 
but if buyer 2's penultimate bid is b2 =2, then buyer I wins with a bid 
bl= v2 + d. Hence, the theoretical English-auction price is p, = v2, or slightly 
above, depending on the auction's unstructured bidding dynamics and 
the size of the standard (or freely chosen, final) bid increment. Since 
buyer 1 is the winning bidder, the allocation is efficient. These results all 
follow, because the English auction is a demand-revealing mechanism. 
The process is capable of enticing any buyer to bid value, if necessary. 
Only the highest-value buyer finds this full-value bid not to be necessary. 
First-price auctions. The first-price, sealed-bid auction uses the same 
allocation and price-determination rule as the English auction-the high 
bidder wins and pays what he bids-but the analysis and predicted out- 
comes are completely different. This result occurs because of the differ- 
ent bid-information conditions in the two kinds of auctions. In the 
first-price auction, each bidder selects a single bid without benefit of any 
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public bid information. Therefore, the amount that i bids can depend 
only on v, and on i's assessment of the other bidders' actions. If i bids 
bi= vi, this maximizes the chance that i will win, but it guarantees a zero 
surplus (vi-bi=O0) if the bid wins. Hence, if i believes that a bid in the 
amount of v has some chance of winning, then there exists an inherent 
trade-off, in which bidding slightly less than v, yields a gain in surplus to 
be weighed against the reduced chance of winning. Any bidder i, who 
either is not extremely risk averse or has no special reason to believe that 
others will bid more, will hedge and bid less than vi. Hence, we can 
predict that each i will bid less than v;. This is why the first-price, sealed- 
bid auction is not a demand-revealing mechanism. 
We can also predict that because bidders are likely to vary in their 
expectations about others' bidding actions and will vary in terms of their 
attitudes toward risk, they are also likely to vary in the extent to which 
they under-reveal demand by bidding less than value. These conditions 
increase the likelihood that the winning bidder will not be the highest- 
value buyer.78 In Figure 1, if buyer 1 is not averse to risk-taking, and if 
he expects others to bid low (because of depressed economic conditions 
or for other reasons), then his bid may be much below v,. By contrast, 
if buyer 2 is very risk averse or not optimistic that others will bid low, then 
he may bid very close to his value. Under such conditions, the item could 
be awarded to buyer 2. Hence, by comparison with the English auction, 
it seems less likely that the first-price auction will be efficient. 
Without adding additional structure to the analysis, we can con- 
clude nothing about what price to expect from the first-price auction. If 
the N values, vi, are regarded as independent occurrences from some 
interval between zero and -0, with all values in this interval being equally 
likely (in a sense this is a characterization of complete ignorance), and if all 
buyers are risk-neutral, expected-surplus maximizers, then we can show 
that a non-cooperative equilibrium-bid function for all i is given by 
bI=(N-1)vilN.7TM That is, the ratio of one's optimal bid to one's 
known value is just the proportion of the bids that will be rejected. 
We can also show that under certain assumptions about the risk-averse 
characteristics of the population of bidders, we can derive an equilibrium 
bid/value ratio for each i, which lies above the Vickrey risk-neutral ratio, 
(N- 1)/N.80 Under Vickrey's assumptions, the expected prices in the 
first-price and English auctions are the same and are equal to the expect- 
ed second highest value: that is, E(p1) = E() = E(v2) = -(N - 1)(N + 1). But, 
the modified model with risk aversion yields a higher expected price in 
the first-price auction; that is, E(pi)>E(p,) 
Dutch auctions. Vickrey was the first o argue that the Dutch-auction 
institution calls for the same kind of strategic considerations as does the 
first-price auction. Each bidder must decide at what price to stop the 
clock, with no information from the auction itself about what competing 
bidders are prepared to bid. If the clock stops, then one learns what a 
competitor has bid, but then the auction is over. It is true that while the 
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clock is still running, each bidder learns that at the previous higher prices, 
no bidder was willing to accept. But, this information is not very informa- 
tive, because what each bidder needs to know is at what lower price the 
most eager buyer is willing to accept. Some have argued that the Dutch 
price will not be very much below the highest value, v,, in Figure 1, 
because each bidder will be motivated to accept the offer as soon as it gets 
just below his value, to avoid losing to another bidder.81 This argument 
ignores the gain in surplus at a lower price, which must be weighed 
against the "cost" of an increased risk of losing the item to another 
bidder.82 Formal analysis of the Dutch auction suggests that it will be 
equivalent (yield the same price and efficiency) to the first-price auction, 
and this equivalence holds under various alterations in the assump- 
tions.83 
Second-price auctions. Vickrey introduced this auction procedure in 
answer to the rhetorical question: Is there "some sealed-bid procedure 
that would be logically isomorphic" to the English auction?84 This auc- 
tion has incentives very different from those of the first-price auction, 
because each bidder knows that, if he is the highest bidder, except for 
ties, then the price paid will be independent of the amount bid. Hence, 
the higher i's bid, the greater is the chance that he will win, with no 
corresponding reduction in surplus, because surplus to i is 
v; 
- b,, if i is 
the highest bidder and j, the second-highest bidder. Each ihas an incen- 
tive to bid his value, vi, as a means of maximizing the chance of winning, 
regardless of his attitude toward risk.85 It would not be optimal for i to 
bid more than vi, because if i wins and the next highest bid is greater than 
v;, 
then a loss is incurred. Thus, in Figure 1 each i has an incentive to 
bid bi= vi. If all bidders do this, then buyer 1 is awarded the item at price 
p2 =2, the theoretical price in the second-price auction. By this reason- 
ing the second-price auction yields the same efficiency, and essentially the 
same price, as the English auction. 
Comparative theoretical properties ofthe standard auctions. In the theory of 
English and second-price auctions, the outcomes are competitive, in the 
sense that the allocations are efficient, and every award is at the price v, 
in Figure 1, which is the lowest price that equates supply (one unit) with 
demand. These theoretical results hold for any number of bidders N;2, 
and they are independent of individual attitudes toward risk. Provided 
only that more surplus is better for each bidder, in the English auction 
bids must continue to increase until v, is reached, and in the second- 
price, sealed-bid auction it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid 
his value, which yields the price v,. If we add Vickrey's assumption, that 
the vi are drawn from the uniform distribution defined on the interval 
from zero to f, then the expected value of price in the English and 
second-price auctions is the expected value of the second highest among 
a sample of N values; that is E(pe)= E(p2)= E(V2)= f(N- 1)I(N + 1). Thus, 
the expected price to the seller approaches the maximum possible value, 
?i, as N is increased. This result does not mean that the market becomes 
"more competitive" with large N. It means merely that the chances grow 
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larger that the second highest value will be near f. In this non-coopera- 
tive theory, the market is just as competitive, in the sense that awards are 
efficient and at a market-clearing price, whether N= 2 or N= 100. 
In the Dutch and first-price auctions, we can articulate no specific 
theory of price and allocation without introducing assumptions about the 
distribution of values and the bidders' attitudes toward risk. If we apply 
Vickrey's assumption, then the outcomes in these two auctions will be com- 
petitive in the sense that the allocations are efficient. But, since the awards 
are at the price vI(N-I)/N, they need not be at a price that equates supply and 
demand. The expected value of this price is E(vi)(N-I)/N=E(v2)= 
f(N - 1)/(N + 1), however, and the awards are competitive in the sense that on 
average the price is the lowest price that clears the market. Consequently, 
outcomes in the Dutch and first-price auctions are competitive in a much 
weaker sense than are the corresponding outcomes in the English and 
second-price auctions. To illustrate this proposition suppose that there are 
two bidders, with v = J10 and v2 = 6. Under the Vickrey assumptions each 
bidder knows his own value and knows that he can regard both values as 
drawn from a uniform distribution. If each person bids to maximize expected 
surplus, on the assumption that the other person will do likewise, then 
bidder I bids b, = v(N - 1)/(N) = 5, while bidder 2 bids b2 = v2(N -* I)(N) = 3. 
The award goes to bidder 1 at price 5 in a Dutch or first-price auction, and 
this price is below the lowest market-clearing price, which is 6. But, in an 
English or second-price auction, the award goes to bidder I at price 6. If the 
values were v, = 14 and v2 = 6, then the Dutch or first-price auction award 
would be at price 7, which is higher than the price (6) in the English and 
second-price auction. These differing outcomes occur, because the probabil- 
ity distribution of prices is different in the Dutch and first-price auctions 
than it is in the English and second-price auctions. But, since the two 
distributions happen to have the same expected value, we can expect prices 
on average to be the same in the two sets of institutions. In the Dutch and 
first-price auctions, the larger is N, the closer is each person's bid to his value, 
and, as in the English and second-price auctions, the expected price 
approaches f. 
If we replace Vickrey's assumption, that bidders are risk neutral, 
with the assumption that they show different degrees of risk aversion,86 
then the allocations are no longer necessarily efficient and expected 
prices are increased in the Dutch and first-price auctions; that is, 
E(pd) = E(p/i)>l D(N - I)/(N + 1) = E((pr) = E(P2). 
Efect of positively dependent values. Suppose that individual buyers' 
values are not independent, because for at least some persons, the item's 
value would increase upon learning that others value it more highly than 
they do. For example, an oil company might value an OCS tract at $100 
million, but revalue it upward on learning that one or more other compa- 
nies assess its value in excess of $100 million. This revaluation could 
occur with any property whose value is based on geophysical or other 
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tests or upon expert appraisal, as with art objects. That in some English 
auctions certain well-known buyers or dealers go to great lengths to 
preserve the secrecy of their bids suggests that they think that this infor- 
mation might affect others' bidding. Cassady reports the incident in 
which Norton Simon was bidding for Rembrandt's Titus in Christie's 
auction house.87 Simon had a written agreement that stipulated a com- 
plicated set of bidding signals. The auctioneer got lost in the procedure 
and awarded the painting to another bidder, before being challenged by 
Mr. Simon, who was indeed the high bidder. It is difficult o understand 
examples such as this, except in terms of some concept of positively 
dependent values.88 
Milgrom and Weber provide a formal analysis of the effect of posi- 
tive value dependence on the various standard auctions.89 As one might 
expect from the different auctions' defining characteristics, the English 
auction's results are affected when values are positively dependent. The 
effect increases price, because as the bidding progresses, the nature of 
the process compels people to reveal their (provisional) willingness-to- 
pay, which makes it possible for others to adjust their personal valuations, 
and so on, until the process stops. Milgrom and Weber also find that the 
Dutch and first-price auctions maintain their equivalence with positively 
dependent values, but the English and second-price auctions no longer 
remain equivalent institutions. 
Fair market value and the standard auctions. If the property at auction 
is an OCS tract available for lease, then the value, vi, might represent 
each company's estimate of the value of leasing the tract, given the lease's 
dimensions, such as the royalty rate, and so forth. These values would 
represent the object's value ex ante the realization of the uncertain future 
variables, such as geological conditions, oil and gas prices, and so forth. 
Referring to Figure 1, and assuming the independence of values, we 
notice that there are natural definitions of several of the concepts of "fair 
market value" discussed earlier.90 
If "fair market value" means the highest possible payment to the 
government, then its achievement requires that v, be paid to the govern- 
ment. But, we can expect none of the auctions discussed here to attain 
that goal. Indeed, we know of no auction process or other pricing mech- 
anism that will do so. A second definition of "fair market value" discussed 
earlier is that the government receives a payment that just exhausts the 
willingness to pay of all losing bidders.91 In terms of Figure 1, this 
definition requires that the government receive v,. Under the assump- 
tions of this example, the second-price and English auctions have the 
theoretically derived property that all bidders fully reveal demand. 
Hence, the payment to the government is predicted to be v2. 
These two alternative concepts of "fair market value" are separated 
by the amount (v - v2). This difference suggests another natural defini- 
tion of "fair market value" to be f(v, + v2)/2, the midpoint between v, 
and v2. The price f guarantees an efficient allocation, clears the market 
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(only one buyer desires the single available unit at that price), and splits 
the difference in the potential seller revenues that separates the previous 
two definitions of "fair market value." 
Since v2 is the tract's opportunity cost, we can also interpret the 
price f as splitting the difference between the tract's (demand) value, v], 
and its (opportunity) cost, v2. From our analysis of the four standard 
auctions, the first-price auction and its theoretical equivalent, the Dutch 
auction, might come closest in practice to approximating f by yielding a 
mean price near E(f). If prices are higher in the first-price auction than 
in the second-price or English auctions, because of risk-averse bidder 
decision making, then average prices near E(f) may occur. But, we know 
of no auction or other pricing mechanism for which the theoretically 
predicted price is necessarily at or near E(f). 
C. The Performance of Experimental Auction Markets 
We can easily reproduce the conditions illustrated in Figure 1 in a 
controlled laboratory experiment. The procedure is to assign each of N 
randomly generated values, denominated in dollars, to Ndistinct buyer 
subjects, with the understanding that the winning bidder in any auction 
will be paid the difference between the winner's assigned value and the 
price determined in the auction. Hence, the subjects' incentives in an 
experimental auction are identical to the representation given in Figure 
1 for any auction. For example, in Figure 1 if subject I with value v, 
eventually announces the final bid, v,, then subject 1 "earns," or is paid, 
v, - v, dollars. If all participants prefer more cash to less, then each i 
will be motivated to bid no higher than v,. Thus, vi provides an upper 
bound on i's willingness to pay for an abstract object in an experimental 
auction. The most common experiment using cash-motivated subjects 
consists of a sequence of ten or more auctions, each with a different 
random assignment of values among the N subjects, with each auction 
guided by the rules that define one of the four standard auctions.92 Since 
the goal of the experiment is to test the Vickrey auction models, the 
experimental conditions reproduce Vickrey's information and structural 
assumptions. That is, each subject knows his assigned value before ten- 
dering a bid in each auction. And, each subject knows the probability 
distribution from which all values were drawn, but he does not know the 
particular value that this procedure assigns to any other bidder. The 
usual experiment is replicated more than once, with a different group of 
N subjects. Experiments using the same or distinct groups, also of size 
N, but different auction rules, allow the different auction institutions to 
be compared. Varying N across experiments with each of the auction 
institutions allows one to discern any effects attributable to the number 
of bidders. These are just the classical methods of experimental science 
applied to the study of auctions in which the treatment variables can be 
the number of bidders, the institution (kind of auction), the distribution 
of values provided to each person (each subject knows his own value, and 
the distribution from which other values are drawn at random). 
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Table 1 summarizes the mean observed price for various values of 
N, for each of the four standard auctions. These data are based on a total 
of 852 auctions conducted in 28 experimental sessions. The Dutch-auc- 
tion experiments for N=8 in 'ITable 1 are not comparable with the other 
Dutch auctions, because they are conducted under different control con- 
ditions.93 These data support the conclusion that English-auction prices 
are below Dutch-auction prices. Also, mean Dutch prices are below those 
in the first-price auction, for all values of N studied. Finally, the lowest 
mean prices occur in the second-price, sealed-bid auction. But, this last 
result is somewhat misleading, because there is evidence that over time 
an increasing number of subjects in second-price auctions submit bids 
equal to their respective values.94 Hence, bidders appear to "learn" over 
time that it is in their self-interest o bid their maximum willingness-to- 
pay. Except for the case in which N=3 (Table 1), both Dutch- and first- 
price-auction mean prices are above Vickrey's risk-neutral prediction, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that bidders act as if they are risk 
averse. Nevertheless, it also remains clear that in these experiments the 
Dutch auction is not equivalent, in terms of the subjects' actual decisions, 
to the first-price auction. Mean Dutch prices are consistently below prices 
in first-price auctions, and therefore the theory of the Dutch auction, 
which ignores the information and technical differences between the 
Dutch and first-price auctions, is deficient. 
That mean Dutch and first-price auction prices tend to be below 
Vickrey's prediction when there are only N=3 bidders suggests that some 
sort of tacit collusion may occur; "tacit" is the right word, because the 
subjects could not communicate during an experiment. We can offer no 
other explanation of these results, which disappear when 
N-4. In Table 1, column 5, curiosity led us to compute the expected value 
of f = (v, + v2)12, which is well-defined by the treatment conditions of 
the reported experiments. It turns out that under the conditions of these 
particular experiments, the first-price auction, except, again, for the case 
of N=3, yields mean observed prices that appear remarkably close to this 
concept of expected "fair market value." In particular, for all N 
- 
3, 
expected fair market value is a better predictor of the mean price than 
is Vickrey's expected risk-neutral price. 
We can obtain additional insight into the comparative performance 
of the different auctions, as well as a strengthening of our conclusions, 
from the efficiency data reported in Table 2. Efficiency is measured here 
as the percentage of auctions, conducted according to a given set of rules, 
in which the award is to the bidder with the highest value. Thus in the 
English auction sessions (N=8), 35 of the 36 auctions (97 percent) repre- 
sented efficient allocations. From Table 2 we see that the English auction 
shows the greatest efficiency, with the second-price auction only slightly 
less efficient han the English auction. The first-price and especially the 
Dutch auctions are considerably less efficient han either the English or 
the second-price auctions. We note in particular that an efficiency order- 
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Table 1. 
Prices in Four Standard Auctions. 
Theoretical 
Number of Maximum Risk-Neutral Fair Mean Observed Price (Number of observations, orauctions) 
Number of Experimental possible (Vickrey) Market 
Bidders, N Groups of size N Valueb, i. Price Valuec, E(f) English Dutch First Second Price 
3 7 $ 4.90 $ 2.50 $ 3.10 - $ 2.42 (110) $ 2.44 (70) $ 1.97 (30) 
4 4 $ 8.10 $ 4.90 $ 5.70 - $ 5.33 (60) $ 5.64 (60) 
5 4 $12.10 $ 8.10 $ 9.10 - $ 8.78 (60) $ 9.14 (60) - 
6 7 $16.90 $12.10 $13.30 - $13.12 (110) $13.22 (60) $11.21 (40) 
8a 2 $10.00 $ 7.80 $ 8.35 $7.48 (36) $ 7.64 (36) - - 
9 4 $36.10 $28.90 $30.70 - $29.26 (60) $31.02 (30) $27.02 (30) 
aPrice data from Coppinger, Smith & Titus, Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions, 18 EcoNoMIe INQUIRY 1, Table 3 
(1980). All other price data are from Cox, Roberson & Smith, Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions, 2 RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL EcoN. 
1 (1982). 
bThe minimum possible value was $0.10 in all experiments. 
C Computed from E(f) = [E(vl) + E(v2)]/2 = 0.10 + (2N 
- 1)(i - 0.10)/2(N + 1). 
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Table 2. 
Efficiency, Percentage Awards to Subject 
with High~st Value. 
Number of 
Bidders English Dutch First Price Second Price 
3 - 82 83 93 
4 - 77 95 - 
5 - 82 93 
6 - 84 83 97 
8" 97 78 
9 - 72 83 90 
Overall 97 80 88 94 
aSee Table 1. 
ing of the institutions is almost the reverse of an ordering based on price. 
Thus, the first-price and Dutch auctions, which yield the highest prices 
to the seller, are the least efficient; he English and second-price auctions, 
which provide the lowest prices, are the most efficient. 
These experimental results provide empirical evidence of a direct 
conflict between efficiency and price, in comparing the various standard 
auctions. No experimental studies have been made of the performance 
of different auctioning institutions under the information and multiple- 
unit-offer conditions of the OCS tracts. But, a reasonable conjecture is 
that a similar conflict may prevail in the OCS paradigm. 
It is natural to ask, "Why should the government worry about the 
efficiency of auctions if it takes in more money from inefficient auctions?" 
The answer is that the government need not concern itself with efficiency 
if its only objective is to maximize its revenue from the sale of OCS tracts. 
But, as we interpret the OCS legislation, the government states that the 
goals of OCS leasing include maintaining competition and promoting the 
timely discovery and development of new oil and gas sources on OCS 
lands.95 An important property of competitive markets is that resources 
are allocated to their highest-valued use. In the case of OCS tracts, those 
companies best able to profit from the discovery and development of 
particular OCS tracts are those for whom such tracts will have the highest 
value. Consequently, the government's stated goals should include con- 
cern for whether these tracts get allocated to the bidders that value them 
most highly. But, as we find in the discussion of the standard auctions, 
if there is uncertainty about value, the different information and incentive 
properties of different kinds of auction institutions may imply that the less 
efficient auctions yield higher prices.96 
Of course, this problem is mitigated if there is free after-market 
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exchange. That is, in an inefficient primary auction, a subsequent ex- 
change can yield an efficient allocation. But, the use of an after-market 
adds to the participants' cost of transacting. Also, if the government 
chooses an inefficient auction method and subsequently observes that the 
winning bidder resells a tract to someone else at a higher price, then the 
government must guard against concluding, from this evidence alone, 
that there must have been a conspiracy in the primary auction. The 
experiments that we describe provide no opportunity for explicit com- 
munication and therefore within the structure of the experiments offer no 
opportunity for formal bidder agreements. Yet, inefficient allocations 
occur as a property of the incentive and information conditions of the 
Dutch- and first-price auction institutions. If these results also character- 
ize OCS auctions, then perhaps the first-price auction procedure that is 
used provides a reasonable compromise between price and efficiency; 
that is, this procedure yields the highest average price, but it is not the 
least efficient institution. 
D. Information and the Collusive Potential of Alternative Auctions 
The theory of auctions previously summarized is a non-cooperative 
theory, based on the hypothesis that people act independently in the 
sense of not acting in concert by tacit or explicit agreement to influence 
the price or the allocation. Non-cooperative theory assumes that people 
will choose bids that are conditional upon what others bid or are expected 
to bid, but that no bid or bids reflect tacit or explicit joint agreements 
among any of the participant buyers or seller. 
Because it is widely believed, often alleged, and sometimes docu- 
mented that collusive buyer rings may influence an auctioned item's 
price, it is important to examine the different standard auctions in terms 
of their manipulative possibilities.97 Here, we discuss three kinds of collu- 
sion: buyer rings, in which two or more buyers enter into an agreement 
to act in concert; an agreement between the auctioneer and one or more 
buyers to act in concert; and, manipulative actions by the seller, in the 
case of private auctions, or in concert with the auctioneer, in the case of 
organized public auctions. 
Buyer ings. Before discussing the mechanics of colluding buyer rings 
and how the different standard auctions might affect their operation, a 
few general observations may provide some perspective on the issue. In 
many auctions of single objects that are offered for sale, especially paint- 
ings and other works of art, the sellers are monopolists, who enjoy all of 
the advantages ordinarily thought to be the privileges of monopoly. Such 
sellers are free to offer or not to offer to sell, and if the decision is to offer 
for sale, then the seller is free to choose any reservation price (minimum 
acceptable bid) that is agreeable to the auction house. Given this menu 
of choice, for the monopolist to complain that buyers may sometimes 
form a ring is a bit like the fox complaining about farmers who fence their 
chickens. 
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Indeed, buyer rings may function as a form of countervailing power 
to a seller's monopoly or monopoly-like dominance. Tacit collusion by 
buyers, in which demand is withheld (under-revealed), has been docu- 
mented experimentally under monopoly pricing, with such buyer collu- 
sion found to be greatly reduced if there are two sellers.98 Similarly, in 
1980 the airlines were reported to have withheld orders for Boeing's new 
757 jet, in the hope that McDonnell Douglas would elect to offer a 
competing jet in the same class.99 Although the government is not a 
monopoly owner of oil- and gas-leasing rights, most of the remaining 
unexplored potential oil- and gas-bearing lands are offshore or on public 
lands, which constitute over one-fourth of the land area of the United 
States. Because of its choice of reservation prices and the time rate at' 
which it places leases at auction, the government's market power seems 
easily as great as that of any bidder or any combination of bidders. 
Suppose that a subset of n buyers, such that in - 
N, agrees to act 
cooperatively. If cooperation is to be achieved, all of the ring's members 
must agree on which member is to receive the item; on the price-deter- 
mining bid to be entered by one of the members, with all others entering 
"shill" (fake) bids designed to give the appearance of an open auction; 
and on the compensation to be paid by the member receiving the item 
to the remaining n - 1 ring members in return for their forbearance. An 
agreement this extensive requires a cohesive group, such as might exist 
among a small group of antique dealers. The conditions most favorable 
to the ring are that the ring includes all or most of the bidders with the 
highest values, and that the item will be resold by the receiving member 
of the group, say, at retail outside of the group, or in an "open" auction 
restricted to the group, thus yielding a well-defined arbitrage profit that 
the ring members will share. 
Even under these conditions if there is insufficient "honor among 
thieves," then the reselling dealer may sell the item at a shill price mod- 
estly above the ring's purchase cost and arrange a private "kick back." Or, 
if the item is resold at "open" auction to the ring, then there may be a 
ring within the ring. Plainly, the more successful is a ring, the greater is 
the incentive for a ring member or members to exploit the agreement for 
private gain. To avoid this exploitation, the ring must devise effective 
monitoring and enforcement procedures. But, monitoring may be costly, 
even if it is feasible, and punishment by expelling a deviant member 
merely provides the ring with one more external competitor. 
If conditions are less favorable, a ring may encounter more serious 
difficulties. If the ring does not include the highest-value bidder, then it 
is almost certain to be unsuccessful in an English or second-price auction. 
But, it may have some chance of success in a Dutch or first-price auction, 
if the highest-value buyer is not very risk averse or is otherwise motivated 
to bid considerably below his value. If the ring includes the highest-value 
buyers, say, the top two, but not the third highest, then the ring can be 
assured of success only if it adopts a bidding strategy that will ensure a 
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price at least as large as v, in Figure 1. Such a strategy is more likely to 
be devised in an English auction than in any of the other auctions. In an 
English auction the ring members could simply agree not to bid against 
each other and to accept, as the ring's purchase cost, the highest neces- 
sary bid. In our example member I or 2 will be the winner at a price v, 
or a little higher. In English auctions in which bidder anonymity is 
preserved, an agreement among ring members not to bid against each 
other requires all ring members to have common knowledge of member 
signaling codes, and to be seated at auction so as to be able to read the 
signals. This is an imposing task, because bidders normally face the 
auctioneer. 00 
The Dutch and sealed-bid auctions make it impossible for a ring to 
use this kind of conditional bidding strategy. With respect to the OCS 
auctions, it is an open question whether it is in the government's interest 
to reveal the bids and identities of all bidders after an auction is complet- 
ed. If a buyer ring is operating in OCS auctions, then such bid informa- 
tion makes it easier for the ring to monitor its members' actions, to learn 
who, when, where, and at what bids the ring lost to outsiders, and to 
adjust the ring's strategies accordingly. From this perspective the Dutch 
auction is probably best, because none of the losing bids are known to 
anyone, and they cannot even be leaked. In sealed-bid auctions all bids 
are known by someone, and a policy of not publicizing bids means only 
that bid information is not generally available at zero cost.101 Observa- 
tions such as these should lead to an appreciation of the ingenious char- 
acteristics that may be captured in the various standard auction 
institutions, whose origins and circumstances of birth are unknown. 
Auctioneer and/or seller collusion. We must modify most of the preced- 
ing discussion if the auctioneer, as agent for the seller, is party to an 
agreement with any buyer or ring of buyers. In the case of a ring, at an 
English auction with bidder anonymity the auctioneer merely can feign 
to have recognized signals from the floor when he is actually implement- 
ing the ring's agreement that no member raise the bid of any other 
member. But, the pivotal importance of the auctioneer in this case sug- 
gests that his services are not likely to be cheap. Indeed, theoretically he 
can extract most of the ring's profits, and no ring member is well motivat- 
ed to punish the auctioneer by revealing his role to the authorities. In the 
case of sealed-bid auctions, a ring could be secretly notified of the bids 
of nonmembers, with the ring submitting new replacement bids to the 
auctioneer, who then "opens" the bids for public announcement of the 
results. The terms of an agreement between any one buyer and the 
auctioneer in a first-price auction might include that if at any time that 
buyer enters the highest bid, then the auctioneer will allow that buyer to 
resubmit a new bid just above the second-highest bid. Similarly, as Vick- 
rey notes, the second-price auction is vulnerable to a "shill" bid just 
below the top bid, to extract a higher price from the top bidder.'02 By 
this device, if bidders all reveal maximum willingness to pay, then the 
seller can extract the maximum possible surplus. 
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This example raises another issue in connection with the question 
of whether bids should be announced after an auction, namely the auc- 
tion's institutional credibility. The advantage in this case of announcing 
all bids, or at least the top two bids, is that bidders can verify that their 
bids are processed honestly, and hence their bidding strategies do not 
have to include an additional source of strategic uncertainty growing out 
of potential fraud. 
E. Combinatorial Auctions 
The combinatorial auction is a sealed-bid auction in which individu- 
al bidders can submit bids for one or more combinations of nonidentical 
items in a multiple-unit auction.103 In a combinatorial OCS auction, in 
which many tracts are offered at auction, a bidder whose test information 
suggests that three particular contiguous tracts have the best prospect for 
a petroleum discovery could enter a bid on the three-tract package and 
also submit bids for the individual tracts, if he so desired. The three tracts 
may have a combined value to the bidder that exceeds the sum of the 
component tracts valued in isolation, perhaps because of the greater 
flexibility that the combined tracts provide in identifying the character 
and extent of the geological structure on which preliminary tests have 
been conducted. The combinatorial auction procedure also permits bid- 
ders to enter various conditional bids. For example, these might include 
a bid for the package of tracts A, B, and C, and a bid for the package D 
and E, but with the understanding that either but not both can be accept- 
ed; or, they might include a bid for tracts A, B, and C, and for D and E, 
and for F, with the total dollar amount of the accepted bids not to exceed 
some limit that the bidder specifies. If combination values exceed the sum 
of component values, then only the combinatorial procedure allows the 
bids to reflect the offering's full potential value, thus facilitating efficient 
allocation. 
The allocation of tracts among bidders in the combinatorial auction 
requires a computer algorithm that could make awards, to maximize the 
offering's total surplus, as the bids reveal under a procedure in which 
winning bidders pay less than the amounts bid (as in the second-price, 
sealed-bid auction). Or, the algorithm could make awards, to maximize 
the seller's total revenue, as determined by the bids under a procedure 
in which winning bidders pay the amount bid, as in the first-price, sealed- 
bid auction. Which allocation procedure actually yields higher revenue to 
the seller is an empirical question that has not yet been examined experi- 
mentally, but we expect the first procedure, maximizing total surplus, to 
be more efficient han the second, maximizing total revenue, because the 
first provides better incentives for demand revelation. Since bidders have 
an incentive to bid higher under the first procedure than under the 
second, the second would not necessarily yield the greater revenue to the 
seller. But, experiments comparing combinatorial auctions using the first 
procedure with noncombinatorial auctions have been conducted, and the 
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results show that the combinatorial auction yields the highest efficien- 
cy.104 
If the total value of tracts in the OCS auction is significantly greater 
in package combinations than in separate components, then the com- 
binatorial auction institution may be the most important alternative to 
current procedures that the government might consider. The extent of 
after-market exchange in past OCS auctions that involved the assembly 
of individual tract awards into packages, or the extent ofjoint exploration 
and development contracting among the winners of different racts, 
would provide partial evidence of interdependent tract values. 
Because the bids have information value to the other bidders, a 
research question of some interest is whether the combinatorial sealed- 
bid auction should be modified to allow individual bids to be tendered 
that are conditional upon other bids. For example, company A might wish 
to bid $100 million for a particular combination of tracts, with the condi- 
tion that the bid be raised to $110 million if any other company bids on 
the same combination, or if anyone else bids more than $100 million, and 
so on. Of course, such a conditional increase in one's bid is always 
possible in the English auction. Would such conditional bids increase or 
diminish the efficiency of primary auction allocations? Would they in- 
crease or diminish revenue to the seller? These are among the important 
research questions, along with the question of how the combinatorial 
auction compares with the current practice of simultaneous bidding for 
separate tracts. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The 1978 Amendments to the OCS Lands Act provide an example 
of the kind of legislation that economists find interesting, because it 
authorizes the creation of some new market institutions. These new insti- 
tutions are the nine auctions authorized for use in selling federal leases 
on OCS tracts, as alternatives to the traditional cash-bonus-bid, fixed- 
royalty-rate lease auction. Of further interest, the legislation requires the 
use of some of the new auctions, within broadly specified percentages of 
lease sales, and it requires the Secretary of the Interior to report regularly 
to Congress on the performance of those newly authorized auctions that 
he uses. In this way, the 1978 Amendments require the Secretary to 
conduct a field experiment in auction-market performance. 
The plaintiffs in Energy Action alleged, inter alia, that the Secretary 
abused his discretion in not using any of the newly authorized auctions 
that provide for bidding on variables other than the size of the cash 
bonus. We can interpret his claim as an allegation that the Secretary was 
subverting the legislation's intent and biasing the mandated field experi- 
ment's conclusions by not using any of the auctions that provide for 
bidding on the downstream payment terms of leases. 
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Section II analyzed some properties of all ten of the authorized 
auctions.105 It began by observing the inverse relationship between the 
size of the up-front payment and the expected downstream payments that 
can be obtained on a lease on any given OCS tract. Furthermore, higher 
front-end lease payments lead to a smaller number of separate bidding 
entities capable of bearing the risk of such payments. In addition, higher 
downstream payments, in relation to downstream production revenues, 
can imply a disincentive for efficient exploration and development of 
leased tracts. Hence, one possible interpretation of the basic issue of 
economic policy underlying the legal issues in Energy Action is an implicit 
disagreement over the relative importance of increasing the number of 
lease-auction bidders versus promoting efficiency in the exploration and 
development of leased tracts. 
The theoretical analysis in Section II implies that some of the newly 
authorized auctions contain lease provisions that would undermine effi- 
ciency in exploration and development of leased tracts. 06 Hence, the 
Secretary may have been well advised in not using them. Finally, the 
theoretical analysis implies that the net-profit-share auctions are the most 
promising for increasing the relative size of downstream payments on 
leases, while diminishing the relative size of up-front payments, without 
introducing serious disincentives for efficient exploration and develop- 
ment of leased tracts.'07 
Theoretical analysis by itself cannot provide satisfactory answers to 
questions about comparative auction performance. Thus, it is encourag- 
ing that Congress sought empirical data on auction performance. But, as 
Section III pointed out, there are serious methodological problems that 
arise in conducting field experiments, to compare the properties of alter- 
native OCS-lease auctions.10s We contrast the requirements of a con- 
trolled experiment on auctions with the field conditions in OCS lease 
auctions and conclude that there is not sufficient control of determining 
variables to permit the derivation of valid empirical answers to some 
central questions. We then argue that controlled laboratory experiments 
on auction markets would provide useful complements to field experi- 
ments, and that laboratory techniques would have several advantages 
over virtually any feasible field experiment. 
As Section IV explains, there is a rich body of work involving labora- 
tory tests of some hypotheses of auction performance.'09 Although there 
are some differences between the auction environments that have already 
been tested in the laboratory and the environment of the authorized 
alternative processes applied to OCS auctions, this literature is enlighten- 
ing nevertheless. It demonstrates that auction rules do matter. It high- 
lights some properties of the first-price, sealed-bid rule common to the 
traditional and alternative OCS auctions, compared with kinds of auc- 
tions not mentioned in the 1978 Amendments. And finally, the existing 
work demonstrates the ability of this relatively new research technique to 
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address precisely the kinds of economic issues that the 1978 Amend- 
ments and Energy Action raised. 
NOTES 
1. 454 U.S. 151 (1981). 
2. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 et seq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
3. It would be impossible to provide here a complete bibliography on auctions and 
on experimental methods in economics. The following references are good primary sources 
with extensive bibliographic information: R. CASSADY, AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 
(1967); Milgrom & Weber, A Theoiy of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 
1089 (1982); and Smith, Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 
923 (1982). 
4. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 et seq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
5. Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 479 F. Supp. 62 (D.D.C. 1979). 
6. Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
7. 454 U.S. at 168-69. 
8. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). 
9. The Court's decision also at one point calls the Secretary's task "experimentation" 
and mentions several times the requirements that the Secretary report periodically to 
Congress. 454 U.S. at 162-65. 
10. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
11. 43 U.S.C. ? 1332(3)-1332(4) (Supp. IV 1980). 
12. 43 U.S.C. ? 1344(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). 
13. H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978). 
14. See, e.g., 454 U.S. at 162, 164, 165. 
15. 43 U.S.C. ? 1344(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). 
16. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
17. Id. ? 1331(o) (Supp. IV 1980). 
18. H.R. REP. No. 1424, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79 (1978). 
19. See43 U.S.C. ? 1331(c) (Supp. IV 1980), and H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 78 (1978). 
20. Id. 
21. The "generous" interpretation of congressional intent was suggested by referees 
of an earlier draft of this essay and is based on H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
79 (1978), in which the conferees state, "This term [fair market value] as defined in 
subsection (o), is only used in this act in relation to the purchase and distribution of oil and 
gas under section 27." Our skepticism that one can thus eliminate any idea of ex post 
valuation from congressional intent is based on two arguments. First, the "generous" 
interpretation of this passage leaves the key phrase "fair market value" undefined for the 
parts of the legislation concerning leases. Second, the section of the same Conference 
Report concerning the "fair market value" of leases makes it clear that the Senate had 
precisely this ex post vantage point. The Report reads: 
Both [the House and Senate versions of the bill] contain as a consideration of a leasing 
program, the receipt of value for lands. The House Amendment provides that activities 
are to be conducted to assure receipt of "fair value for the lands leased and the rights 
conveyed by the Federal Government." The Senate bill provides for leasing activities 
to be conducted to assure receipt of "fair market value for the oil and gas owned by 
the Federal Government." The Conference Report follows the House amendment 
with the addition of the term "market" so as to read "fair market value for the lands 
leased and the rights conveyed by the Federal Government." Id. at 103. 
Furthermore,. the respondents "complained that bonus bidding cannot generate adequate 
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competition to yield a fair market return for OCS oil and gas as required by the 1978 Amend- 
ments." 454 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added). 
22. Many of these times the term's use is in a quotation from a congressional 
committee report. In addition to the quotation in supra note 21, the Court's opinion quotes 
S. REP. No. 284, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 46-47, 73 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 
Ist Sess. 47, 54, 138-39 (1977); and H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978). 
See 454 U.S. at 162 n.14, 164 n.16, 166 n.18. 
23. Referees of an earlier draft of this essay pointed out that the federal government 
does not own all possible oil and gas leases. Furthermore, the value of oil and gas leases 
is critically dependent upon the expected price path of the resources, and the federal 
government is not a monopolist in these markets. We do not believe that these are sufficient 
conditions to ensure that the federal government, as a consequence, faces a perfectly elastic 
demand for OCS leases. 
24. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1977). The full quotation is: "To 
increase competition for off-shore leases and secure higher returns to the public Treasury, 
section 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act has been amended to allow the Secretary 
to use other bidding methods based on net profits; royalty; or work commitments tated 
in dollar amounts." Quoted in 454 U.S. at 167 n.18. 
25. The Court held that "[i]n alleging that the bidding systems currently used by the 
Secretary of the Interior are incapable of producing a fair market return, California clearly 
asserts the kind of 'distinct and palpable injury' that is required for standing." 454 U.S. at 
161 (citation omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 38-51. 
27. See, e.g., Cox, Roberson & Smith, Theoty and Behavior of Single Object Auctions, 2 
RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 1 (1982); Forsythe & Isaac, Demand Revealing Mechanisms 
for Private Good Auctions, 2 RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 45 (1982); and Vickrey, Counter- 
speculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961). 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 72-96. 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 74-85. 
30. The Court noted that "(t]he Secretary of the Interior has not experimented, 
however, with any of the systems using a factor other than the size of a cash bonus as bidding 
variable." 454 U.S. at 157 (emphasis original) (footnote omitted). And, it argued that "[t]he essence of California's complaint . . . is that the Secretary of the Interior, by failing to test 
non-cash-bonus systems, has breached a statutory obligation to determine through experi- 
ment which bidding system works best." 454 U.S. at 161. 
31. See, e.g., Reece, Competitive Biddingfor Offshore Petroleum Leases, 9 BELLJ. ECON. 369 
(1978), and Wilson, A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition, 44 REV. EcON. STUD. 511 (1977). 
32. See Milgrom & Weber, supra note 3. 
33. SeeJ. Cox & R. M. Isaac, In Search for the Winner's Curse (1983) (Discussion 
paper, University of Arizona Dept. of Economics). 
34. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1977). 
35. See Wilson, supra note 31. 
36. Here, we abstract from the differential income-tax treatment of the write-off of 
lease bonuses for productive and relinquished leases. As a reader of an earlier draft of this 
essay pointed out, different tax treatments are applied to the write-off of the bonus, depend- 
ing on the production rate if the tract is developed or the abandonment rate if the lease 
is relinquished during the diligence period. Because a similar argument applies to develop- 
ment costs, a substantial amount of risk sharing does fall on the government, even in pure 
cash-bonus bidding under current income-tax law. 
37. These problems are explored in Forsythe & Isaac, supra note 27, and in Rassenti, 
Smith & Bulfin, A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation, 13 BELLJ. 
ECON. 402 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 103-104. 
38. See Reece, supra note 31, and Smith, Non-Aggressive Bidding Behavior and the "Win- 
ner's Curse, " 19 ECON. INQUIRY 380 (1981). 
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39. 45, Fed. Reg. 9,536 (1980). 
40. The GNP fixed-weight price index is an index of the prices of all goods and 
services that comprise the GNP. The fixed weights that are currently applied to prices are 
1972 expenditure shares in GNP. The index is regularly published in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC( ANAIYSIS, SURV. OF CURRENT Bus. 
41. 45 Fed. Reg. 36,784 (1980). 
42. Accounting procedures for calculating expenses and profits are set out in 10 
C.F.R. 390 (1983). 
43. 45 Fed. Reg. 9,536 (1980). 
44. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,680 (1981). 
45. Accounting procedures for calculating expenses and profits are set out in 10 
C.F.R. 390 (1983). 
46. 46 Fed. Reg. 35,614 (1981). 
47. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 et seq. (1976). 
48. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 et seq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
49. "Risk" refers to uncertain returns, whether positive or negative. Thus, if part of 
the payment to the government is a contingent royalty payment, then the government bears 
some of the risk associated with the lease's uncertain value. 
50. 10 C.F.R. 390 (1983). 
51. The OCS Lands Act gives the Secretary of the Interior the authority to reduce 
to zero the royalty rate on leases sold with the traditional auction, to encourage high-cost 
production. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(3) (Supp. IV 1980). But, to date the Secretary has not 
exercised this authority on active leases, presumably because of the administrative and 
political problems that he would encounter. 
52. "Through the 1978 Amendments, Congress sought to experiment with alterna- 
tives to the traditional bidding system." 454 U.S. at 154. 
53. Noting in Section II the list of undesirable properties of the work-commitment- 
bid auction, one is tempted to speculate that these properties could have led the Secretary 
to bypass that category of auction in fulfilling the congressional directive. See supra text 
accompanying notes 46, 51-52. 
54. For example, one investigation of alternative methods of airport-slot allocation 
combines economic theory, field data, and experimental data. SeeGrether, Isaac & Plott, The 
Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Competitors, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (1981). 
55. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). 
56. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1980). 
57. Firms also make selection decisions even when only one auction process is 
offered. That is, if all tracts are offered using auction process A, some firms will choose not 
to bid at all. And, if all tracts are offered using auction process B, some firms, although 
perhaps not the same set, will choose not to bid at all. The set of bidders is an important 
property of an auction, and finding out the nature of their decisions does not constitute a
"bias." But, if the field experiment's randomizing requirements imply that auctions A and 
B will be used concurrently to test which one should be used in the future, self-selection 
bias between the two kinds can determine the experiment's results. The sets of bidders 
when A and B are offered concurrently will not necessarily match the selection decisions 
when only one of the two auction processes is available. 
58. See, e.g., the works cited supra notes 3, 27. 
59. We can capture in the laboratory the decisions of firms to bid or not to bid when 
only one auction process is available, see supra note 57, while eliminating the inter-auction, 
self-selection biases. Of course, if one were interested in a multiple-auction environment 
in which self-selection between different kinds of auctions is a relevant feature, then we 
could also provide for this sort of variation in the laboratory. The key aspect is the control 
and flexibility of laboratory experiments in determining the selection decisions that are 
available. 
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60. For a comprehensive discussion of many different auction methods and their 
history and uses, see R. CASSADY, Supra note 3. 
61. Id. at 26. 
62. Id. at 28. 
63. Id. at 60-61. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
65. Vickrey, supra note 27, at 20. 
66. R. CASSADY , supra note 3, at 152-53. 
67. Vickrey, supra note 27, at 21. 
68. R. CASSADY , supra note 3, at 71. 
69. Id. at 71. R. CASSADY cites Rex v. Taylor, M'Cle. 362, 148 E.R. 141 (1824), in 
which this scheme was used. 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
71. To illustrate these comments further, imagine an auction in which two items are 
offered for sale, a new Cadillac and a new Chevrolet. Everyone knows which item is being 
offered. If all would be willing to pay more for the Cadillac, then this preference,is consis- tent with the second assumption, as long as no one is willing to pay more, because of what 
some other bidder is willing to pay. Now, suppose that a "blind" auction is conducted, in 
which the item is guaranteed to be either a Cadillac or a Chevrolet, and that some bidders 
know that the car is white, and others know that it is a four-door sedan. Further, suppose 
that it is known that Cadillacs are much more likely to be white than are Chevrolets, and 
that Cadillacs are slightly more likely to be four-door sedans than are Chevrolets. Clearly, 
each bidder's willingness to pay for the "blind" item will now depend on which of the two 
kinds of information he possesses and on his assessment of the relevant probabilities. 
Furthermore, knowing that some other person is willing to pay more suggests that that 
person has better information (white versus four-door) or a better assessment of the infor- 
mation's implications. The OCS auction is like this "blind" auction in that the characteris- 
tics of the auctioned item are unknown, but they can be estimated imperfectly, based on 
information that is obtainable. The theory of auctions with these information characteristics 
has been studied (see, e.g.,J. RAMSEY, BIDDING AND OIL LEASES (1980)), but this theory, and 
the performance of such auctions, has yet to be subjected to an experimental examination 
similar to that which has been applied to the standard auctions. 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. 
73. That price and efficiency considerations may be in conflict implies that the 
government's goal of maximizing revenue (to provide a "fair" return to the public) may be 
in conflict with maintaining or increasing competition, since efficiency is an important 
attribute of competitive outcomes. 
74. See iinfra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
75. An "after-market exchange" is one that is immediately motivated by the results 
of the primary auction. Further exchanges long after the primary auction are likely, because 
of new information affecting values, but they provide little concrete evidence of inefficiency. 
76. See infra text accompanying notes 103-104. 
77. To the extent that the government desires to promote OCS competition and its 
concomitant efficiency of allocation, after-market exchange should be welcomed. To the 
extent that the government's object is to maximize revenue from the sale of OCS leases, 
after-market exchange implies that the primary auction captures less than the full-revenue 
potential. But of course, it may not be possible to design an auction that maximizes revenue 
and that is also always efficient. 
78. Mathematically, we can illustrate the effect of risk aversion thus: let the utility of 
the surplus, v-b, to a winning bidder be (v-b)', such that 0 r< 
1. If r= 1, then the 
bidder is risk neutral. The smaller is r, the more risk averse is the bidder. If G(b) is the 
probability that a bid in the amount of b will win, then the bidder's expected utility is 
U(b) = (v - b)G(b). If r = 1, then the optimal bid, at which the derivative U'(b) = 0, occurs at a 
value for b, such that (v - b)G'(b) = G(b); that is, the bid equates the expected marginal gain 
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from the increased chance of winning with the expected marginal loss of surplus. If r < 1, 
then the optimal bid occurs at a value for b such that (v - b)G'(b)/r= G(b). Consequently, the 
effect of increased risk aversion (decreased r) is to increase the relative value (utility) of the 
expected marginal gain, and this increases the optimal bid. The more risk averse a bidder, 
the greater is the subjective weight given to the marginal gain from an increased chance 
of winning in the trade-off between this gain and the marginal loss in surplus, and thus the 
greater is the bid that balances these two components. 
79. Vickrey, supra note 27, at 16-17, 20, 29-30. 
80. Cox, Roberson & Smith, supra note 27, at 10-13. 
81. See K. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42 (rev. ed. 1948), and R. CASSADY , supra 
note 3, at 67. 
82. See supra note 78. In the Dutch auction it is optimal to stop the clock at the price 
b, such that (v - b)G'(b)/r= G(b), and therefore one's bid "should" be the same as in a first- 
price auction. 
83. See Cox, Roberson & Smith, supra note 27, at 6-8; Milgrom & Weber, supra note 
3, at 1095; and Vickrey, supra note 27, at 20. 
84. See Vickrey, supra note 27, at 20. 
85. Mathematically, in contrast with supra note 78, surplus to the winning bidder is 
v - x, such that x is the (uncertain) second highest bid. If F(x) is a person's subjective 
probability that the second highest bid is less than or equal to x, then the expected utility 
from a bid of b is U(b)=b (v - x)rdF(x).The optimal bid b must stisfy U'(b)= (v - b)F'(b)= 0, 
which implies that v- b = 0, or b = v, provided that the bidder bdlieves that increasing b will 
increase the probability that the bid b will win; that is, F'(b)>O. Notice in particular that this 
result is independent of r; it is also independent of the utility function and it only requires 
the assumption that "more (surplus) is better" for the bidder. 
86. As in Cox, Roberson & Smith, supra note 27, at 10-12. 
87. R. CASSADY, supra note 3, at 150-51. 
88. R. CASSADY, Id. cites other examples, as in Conover v. Walling, 15 N.J. Eq. 173, 
179 (1852). 
89. Milgrom & Weber, supra note 3, at 1095, 1100-1111. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 14-29 & n.21. 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
92. See the descriptions of the experimental procedures in Coppinger, Smith & Titus, 
Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-BidAuctions, 18 EcoN. INQUIRY 1, 4-5, 12-13 
(1980), and in Cox, Roberson & Smith, supra note 27, at 14-20, 34-42. 
93. For example, the payoff potential per subject was lower, the Dutch-price decre- 
ment larger, and the speed of price decline much slower than in the other Dutch auctions. 
94. Coppinger, Smith & Titus, supra note 92, at 19. 
95. 43 U.S.C. ? 1332(3) (Supp. IV 1980). 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92. 
97. See R. CAssAmi; supra note 3, at 179-92, for several citations involving antiques, 
fish, timber, and wool. 
98. D. Coursey, R. Isaac & V. Smith, Natural Monopoly and the Contestable Markets 
Hypothesis: Some Experimental Results 33 (1982) (Discussion paper, University of Arizona 
Dept. of Economics). 
99. Zonana, Boeing's Sale to Delta Gives It Big Advantage over U.S. Competitors, Wall St. 
J., November 13, 1980, at 1, col. 6. 
100. The origin of the term "ring" appears to be that in "knockdown" sales in which 
the conspiring buyers resell the item to one of their group, the members formed a circle, 
or "ring," around their leader or organizer to facilitate the surveillance of each member by 
the others, and thus to assure an open after-market auction for determining the ring's 
profits from the agreement, See R. CASSADY, supra note 3, at 177, 182-83. 
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101. But, as we note earlier, announcement of the winning bid facilitates an efficient 
after-market exchange if the original award is inefficient. See supra text accompanying notes 
75-77, 96-97. 
102. Vickrey, supra note 27, at 22. 
103. See Rassenti, Smith & Bulfin, supra note 37, which proposes the combinatorial 
auction and examines its performance characteristics using experimental methods. 
104. Id. at 407-412. 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 38-52. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96. 
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